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3PART ONE
BULGARIA’S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: 1991 - 1997
INTRODUCTION
A prior version of this paper was a part of a larger Warning
Paper, “Bulgaria: Risks of Political Future” which was drafted
by the Center for Liberal Strategies (CLS) and IME under a
special contract between CLS and UNDP. Copyrights on the
Warning Paper, which consists of a broader policy analysis,
belong to UNDP. On behalf of IME, the drafting team involved
the following associates: Svetlana Alexandrova, Senior
Economist, Andrey Ivanov, Ph.D., Senior Policy Analyst, Asia
Yonkova and Lachezar Bogdanov, Economists; in certain
sections, such as the paragraphs on Investment and Savings,
and those on Banks, we used calculations made by Rossen
Rozenov and Tzvetan Manchev, part-time 1996 and 1997 IME
researchers; in the Property and Creditors’ Rights section we
used previous publications of Stefan Kuychukov (IME
Newsletter, March 1996) and consulted current developments
with Assen Djingov, partner at Djingov, Gouginski, Kuychukov &
Velichkov; in the Annex we used materials prepared by IME as
background material for CSFB Bulgaria’s inevstor guide;
scenarios and economic hypotheses have been discussed by the
entire team; and Krassen Stanchev, Ph.D., IME Executive
Director, is responsible for putting the paper together and
deriving relevant conclusions.
Our goal was to propose foundations for a long-term (fifteen
years) country risk forecast. This is a first attempt for
Bulgaria. The idea is to follow probable scenarios in order to
give recommendations on policies geared toward avoiding
negative developments. The paper consists of two parts, the
first dealing with the current economic environment and the
second with scenarios. Separately we devote a section to
policy recommendations ,and give an Annex with ten paragraphs
of economic and political information important for
understanding the entire text; the last of these paragraphs
deals with methodological issues.
BACKGROUND
Bulgarian economic reforms started in February 1991, a delay
of 15 months after the communist regime fell. A political
consensus was achieved on the following main economic reform
targets: a) monetary and fiscal policies: financial
stabilization, inflation curbing, money aggregates and budget
deficit regulation; b) structural reform: changing patterns of
economic behavior through prompt privatization; c) effective
economic governance: exercising pressure on enterprises to
adjust to the changing economic environment, and setting up
fundamental market economy institutions in the country; and d)
4effective general economic policies: attempting to follow
coherent economic policy.1
The philosophy of this agenda, and even the wording, have been
very similar to that of that of Poland, expressed in the
“Government Program of Economic Stabilization” of October
1989, associated with the name of then Vice-Premier Leszek
Balcerowicz.2
The difference between the two programs has nothing to do with
their content. It lies in the political setting. Bulgaria’s
reform goals have never been publicly announced as a part of
any political party agenda. Moreover, they have never been
included in a written government statement. The initial
consensus was based on the effects of the unilaterally
announced moratorium on the country’s foreign debt payments in
March 1990. The implementation of market reforms proceeded
successfully until the elections of October 1991. The
democratic minority cabinet of 1991-1992 attempted to follow
the same philosophy without daring to scrap price controls and
promptly privatize This delay has caused corruption in public
sector management. The emerging private sector grew on the
decapitalization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and
especially of large and constitutionally protected3 monopolies.
With eroded parliamentary support, the democratic cabinet
resigned. The cabinet of experts succeeded in signing, in mid-
1994, a Brady plan for Bulgaria, restructuring its foreign
debt by 47%. In order to fulfill foreign debt payment
schedules the government had to achieve growth rates of 4-5%
of GDP in 1995 and 1996. Technocrats, backed by ad hoc
majorities in the legislature, failed to promote the private
sector and an investment-friendly environment. Their
                    
1See: Antonov, Ventzislav, Roumen Avramov (Eds.) The year of the Iron Sheep: Bulgarian Economic
Reform in 1991. Sofia, Agency for Economic Coordination and Development, 1992.
2It included: “a) return to a monetary economy with stable money
understood as the criterion, rather than narrowly as an instrument,
and with money recognized as a measure of value, convertible,
universally accepted and balancing the market; b) return to the
market mechanism as the main mode of functioning of the economy,
ensuring equilibrium of supply and demand, abandonment of economic
function, genuine prices and a hard mechanism of verification of
production influencing allocation decision; c) return to private
ownership as the condition of microeconomic rationality and the basis
of work on one’s own account and responsibility” Waclaw Wilczynski,
Five Years of the Polish Transformation: 1989-1994, In: Five Years
After June: the Polish Transformation, 1989-1994, Ed. by Jan
Winiecki, London, The Center for Research into Communist Economies,
1996, p. 24. In Poland, the initial reform stage was interrupted by
general elections as well, however, the reform philosophy was
consciously and publicly pursued even after ex-Communists’ turnover
in 1994, and managed to produce its main results.
3Article 18 of the Bulgarian Constitution establishes 12 exclusive government monopolies: on energy,
communications, mineral, natural and water resources, coastal area and transport; the constitution,
however, stipulates that execution of these exclusive rights should be regulated by a specific law; such
a law was adopted in November 1995, the Concessions Law, which is still not implemented.
5successors, the socialists, not only gave up 1991’s reform
ideas but introduced opposite economic policies. Zhan
Videnov’s administration, backed by an absolute majority in
the Parliament, attempted a sort of second edition of the
central planning,4 supported loss-making public sector, at the
price of draining the banking sector and causing severe
macroeconomic disequilibrium, and brought the country back to
the brink of defaulting in mid-1996, this time with a Brady
deal in place.
Thus, Bulgaria has happened to have no economic agenda, nor a
stable enough majority to proceed with reforms. The chain of
changing governments is shown in paragraph 2 of the Annex.
Each new government was experimenting with new ideas.
MACROECONOMIC HERITAGE
1996 was an extreme case of suffered financial shocks,
providing the incentive to derive lessons for the future. (For
more details on the previous year’s macroeconomic dynamics see
Annex, paragraph 3.)
At the end of December, when the socialists resigned, the
National Statistics Institute (NSI) announced that the
accumulated inflation for the year was 310%. (In the first
quarter of 1997 inflation rocketed to 438%.) Consumer price
index (CPI) deflated interest rate on bank deposits (even
after the drastic increase of the basic interest rate (BIR) of
the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) in late September to 300% a
year) was negative — minus 43%. (In February 1997, BIR was 18%
a month, while inflation reached an unprecedented 242%.)
Throughout 1996, both general public and business corporations
were converting savings into hard currency and keeping as much
as possible in cash.
The differential in yield between lev deposits and hard
currency deposits is another lesson. On January 2, 1996, the
BNB rate was 70.719 Bulgarian levs (BGL) to US $1, and on
December 12 (the BGL depreciation peak in 1996) it was 511.69
BGL/USD. This means BGL depreciation of 624%. The accumulated
interest rate on one-month time deposits barely reached 104%.
The difference between the level of inflation and of BGL
depreciation against the US dollar was mainly due to shrinking
solvent demand. However, this did not last because merchants
and manufacturers couldn’t keep prices below costs. By mid-
January 1997 the rate was already at the level of 1,000 BGL
per USD, and by the first week of February it reached BGL
3,000. (Some markets dollarized completely; in real estate
virtually all (96%) transactions were executed in US dollars,
in the car market 80% of deals were in DM; in some special
weeks most consumer goods were salable in hard currency;
despite regulations, the USD became and in 1997 still is a
                    
4 In 1991, price liberalization left only 10% of prices (those on fuel, communications, electricity and
public transport) under government control; by 1994 price controls grew slowly to 16% of the
consumer basket to reach 49% in 1996.
6dominant accounting unit. In March 1997, after tight and
coordinated monetary policies of the caretaker cabinet and
BNB, the local currency appreciated by 50%, back to 1,500, and
stabilized at this level.)
This was a logical end to an entire period of economic
instability.
An indicator of instability is inflation. In 1991, it was
473.7%. If followed on a monthly basis, one will see that in
the second half of 1993 and first two months of 1994 inflation
averaged at 5%. According to NSI, in the period between April
1995 and April 1996 the monthly inflation rate decreased to
less than 3%. For the remainder of 1996, after reaching over
20%, the CPI was steady at the two-digit level. Meanwhile,
during the 1993-1996 period other transition economies had
experienced, albeit uneven, progress in stabilization.5
More than five years of instability put the country among the
highest in terms of risk, indicated by low level of foreign
direct investments (FDI) in absolute and per capita terms. In
the 1992-mid-1996 period FDI per capita was 19 times lower
than in Hungary, 1.4 times lower than in Albania, almost 13
times lower than in Slovenia, and 3.8 times lower than in
Croatia, which suffered war and isolation.6 Some banks active
in the region have put Bulgaria in 14th place in terms of
country risk, among sixteen European emerging markets.7
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
Macroeconomic instability has been a factor in the constant
diminishing of every incentive to save and invest. We may
take, for instance, 1994, when the GDP showed a slight
positive growth and the economy seemed to enter an upturn
phase of the business cycle — which, however, later (in 1995)
was suppressed, mainly by price controls and accumulation of
bad debts in the banks (the 1996 crisis was combined with a
                    
5For the sake of comparison, stabilization developments (CPI rates) in selected countries look as
follows:
country/year 1993 1994 1995 1996
Czech Republic 20.8 10.0 9.1 9
Romania 295 62. 28 45
Slovakia 25.1 11.7 7.2 5
Slovenia 22.8 19.5 9 10
Source: OECD
6Source: OECD
7Anton Burghardt, Guenter Lanier, Competitiveness of CEE, A Bank
Perspective, Giro-Credit Bank, February 1997.
7lost confidence in the banking system). Because of the
country's inability to attract a sufficient amount of foreign
investments, it needed mobilization of domestic savings.
However, for the period between 1991 and 1994, investments as
a percentage of the GDP went down, from 22.6% to 8.2%. Graph 1
shows that up until 1990 the level of investment and savings
was compatible with that of the developed economies. The high
rate of savings during the 1980s, however, did not result from
any voluntary decisions on the part of economic agents who
valued their future consumption higher; it ensued rather from
the restricted choice of goods and services available. The
liberalization of imports and prices in 1991, as well as the
drop in real incomes, brought about the shrinkage of the
relative share of savings in the GDP.
Graph 1
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A sharp drop in investment activity is visible after 1992.8 The
underlying reasons are in the volatile macroeconomic
environment, weakened demand, and the absence of
privatization. Investment distribution by sector is shown on
Table 2.
Table 2: Growth of gross industrial output by sector9
sector indices of output/year (previous
year=100) share of total output (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1995
Industry - total 83 88.2 107.8 109.8 41.2
Electro/thermal power 82.3 88.4 96.9 105.7 3.1
Coal 95.9 99.3 96.6 108.2 0.7
Oil & gas 98.9 151.1 110.2 155 0.1
Ferrous metallurgy 56.3 128.8 124.9 116 2.7
(incl. mining)
Mech. engineering 78.3 79.9 96.3 114.4 4.4
Electrical 67.7 94.5 95.6 113.2 2.1
Chemical & oil 83.4 88.6 137.1 121.7 9.9
Constr. materials 80.6 100.1 115.5 107.4 1.1
Timber & wood 88.1 91.5 111.4 100.4 1.3
                    
8According to BNB, at the end of 1996 gross domestic savings as
percentage of GDP were at 13.5% while gross investment was 12.5% of
GDP.
9Source: NSI and OECD.
8Pulp & paper 90.4 89.4 112.4 120 0.8
Glass 82.5 95.9 123.1 107.7 0.6
Textiles & knitwear 87.7 82.9 102.9 99.7 1.5
Clothing 89.3 91.3 112.6 87.5 0.7
Leader 90.2 85.2 102.7 90.2 0.6
Print & Publishing 83.1 126.5 112.9 85.3 0.6
Food processing 88.8 73.4 98.8 104.3 8.1
Other 129.9 113.9 61.4 80.5 0.5
Leading investment sectors are heavy industries, i.e. those
with lower private sector shares and quasi-fiscal subsidies.
The savings dynamic is similar to that of investments. The
economic entities manifest different ways in which they
dispose of income and therefore show a different savings
picture. As Graph 2 reveals, improvements took place in 1994
and 1995, mainly due to favorable current account balances
(see charts in economic scenarios section). In mid-1996,
savings were only 3.5% of GDP.
Graph 2. Dynamics of savings as % of the GDP
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In the first eight months of 1997, restoration of confidence
resulted in a rise in hard currency savings by an amount equal
to 6.5% of GDP, and those in BGL by 5%, by the end of the year
gross domestic savings are expected to grow to 16.2% of GDP
while investment will remain basically unchanged (13% of GDP).
However, it is impossible to draw a precise distinction
between public’s at large and the private sector savings. As
the next section shows, corporate businesses have been
insufficiently developed, and the private sector is mostly
sole proprietors, small-scale partnerships and limited
liability companies. Businessmen prefer to keep an idle
company for their personal accounts (which in early 90s meant
better interest rates). In 1996, a “government protection of
bank deposits” law was adopted, covering 100% of individual
9deposits from the budget and setting a strong incentive to
convert corporate accounts into personal ones.10
According to the BNB, the population's deposits grew by 25.5
billion levs in 1993, and about 18 billion levs in 1994. But
throughout the entire 1991-1996 period the interest rates on
deposits were lower than the CPI. This has gradually
undermined savings purchasing power, and depositors suffered
losses. In the period between 1991 and 1997, two years marked
record negative real interest rates: -24% in 1994 and -43% in
1996. In 1997 "memory" is a factor in restraining savings, and
is likely to prevent slow confidence restoration in 1998.
After the 1991 removal of subsidies to SOEs, the latter found
a substitute for state grants: non-payment of credits back to
banks. A special incentive to do so was the law which had
written off about US $1 billion debts accumulated prior to
1991. (About the impact of this factor of growth prospects,
see scenarios below.)
Given poor financial health, SOEs’ corporate governance total
amount of retained profit in their 1994 balance sheets (the
year of first registered transition growth) barely marked 0.2%
of reported capital. The net profitability11 in industry (66%
of SOEs’ capital in 1994-1996) was 7.87 in 1992, minus 12.74
in 1993, and minus 4.89 in 1994. A particularly grave
situation was seen in electric and thermal power, coal mining,
and the engineering and machine-tool industry. These are the
sectors where 1997 reforms should start first, but in the
first six months of the Democratic government there has been
no change. The rate of covering losses in SOEs (through
various forms of writing off debts) amounted to about 15% of
the GDP for 1996, but in 1997 it will not exceed 1% of the
GDP, i.e. this practice will in fact discontinue.
PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITALIZATION
In 1991-1996, the Bulgarian business community was involved in
constant change. The emerging private sector encountered
different impediments to development.12 The increased number of
private companies did not result in an adequate political
establishment, promoting the interests of the private sector.
                    
10. In the fall of 1997 this law is likely to be discontinued.
11 Net profitability has been measured as the ratio of (profit minus loss) to total receipts.
12On one hand, registration (but not all cost of entry) barriers are low. Formal exit barriers
(opportunities to go out of business when the risk is estimated high) are also negligible but only in case
given businesses operate at low credit levels. However, to registration one should add costs of:
licensing, dealing with the government (reporting, unstable tax regulation, lax tax collection, increased
price controls and of informal contract enforcement (according to IME survey 35% of private
companies in the big cities of the country pay a protection fee in addition to insurance)).
10
There is no reliable data on how many sole proprietorships
were established to reduce social welfare and other taxes.13
The response of the business community to slow privatization
(see paragraph 3 of the economic Annex) and government control
was to set up as many associations as possible and lobby for
quotas.14 This is especially true for the large (nation-wide
and cross-sectoral) business associations, like Bulgarian
Industrial and Trade Chamber (BITC), Bulgarian Industrial
Association (BIA), and the Bulgarian Agricultural Chamber
(BAC). The exceptions here are the Union for Private Economic
Enterprise (UPEE) and the Vazrazhdane Union (VU). There are
sectors such as banking, for which dependence on government
decisions and the slow pace of privatization did not allow for
effective self-confident alliance of private agents.15 Foreign
companies, united in the Bulgarian International Business
Association (BIBA), are among the few players promoting
business culture and corporate citizenship. With the political
changes of 1997 BIBA’s impact has gained momentum.
At the end of 1989 Bulgaria had about 24,500 private firms
registered, set up as a response to Council of Ministers
Decree 33/1984. In June 1994, 35% of individuals earning
income in the private sector reported to NSI that they were
self-employed, and 6% indicated they were family members in a
business. The long-term assets of small private sector
companies are basically capitalized from personal and family
sources. By mid-1994 private companies already numbered
330,000 but by the end of 1996 their number had decreased to
307,000.16
                    
13Opportunities to reduce some taxes explain why every eighteenth Bulgarian citizen at an active age
is a sole proprietor.
14By December 1996, the total number of SOEs was 9,682, with 1,852,000 employees (39% of the
total workforce), and 86% of the country’s long-term assets (Source: NSI); business associations,
seeking political influence, could close themselves against SOE representatives; however, this
membership strategy reduced potential associations’ political strength; in general they have been failing
to influence economic policies.
Meanwhile, Bulgarian legislation has no realistic definition of small/medium enterprise (SME);
Council of Ministers Decree 108 of June 21, 1991 On Establishing Preconditions for Small Enterprises’
Development considers an SME to be an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 workers and
possesses long-term assets of less than 20 million BGL (approximately US $1.2 million in June 1991,
now US $10,250); already in 1992, more than 90% of private firms reported having fewer than 5
employees, and less than 0.1% of firms had more than 50 employees; a great majority of private firms
were sole proprietors or family businesses with negligible facilities (long-term assets).
15Bulgarian Association of Commercial Banks (BACS) has been failing to self-regulate and represent
the banking sector due to banks’ dependence on BNB and State Savings Bank refinancing.
16The World Bank book, Financing Government in Transition: Bulgaria (The political Economy of
Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion (edited by Zeljco Bogetic and Arye Hillman), The World
Bank, Washington D.C., 1995, lists the following reasons for the rapid growth of private firms in that
period: individuals “prepared themselves for the capitalist market economy by becoming “capitalists”;
unemployment made the opportunity costs of “going into business” low, tax and other incentives to
register, and “the choice to be small”, i.e. to be invisible for the tax authorities” (p.50).
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Incentives to register and stay “small” are numerous.
Registration and lawyers’, and other “fixers” of formality
fees have been consistently low17. As start-off cost they are
roughly the same as in other Central and East European
countries, considerably lower than in Latin American countries
but higher than in the US. However, there are different
barriers to running a business. They are negligible in trade,
where opening a shop or selling on the street or at an open-
air market up until 1995 required no special permit or
license. But the number of permits required grows with the
sophistication of businesses.18
As mentioned, private firms capitalize on family resources
(75-80% were set up in this manner, as an IME special survey
indicated in 1996), but grow on links with the public sector.
Private entrepreneurs reduce SOEs’ operating costs as sub-
contractors. Given their size however, SOEs are difficult to
restructure. Lack of (political) will to do so set incentives
to decapitalize them. SOEs’ benefit was to avoid idle use of
inventory and personnel; private firms collected profits as
contributors to maintained production but did not report and
invest the profits.
There are tax incentives to remain small. The number of sole
proprietorships must be explained partially by preferential
tax treatment, allowing lower social welfare duties (the
general requirement is 42%, payable by the employers).
Employees pay 12% to 40% of their monthly wages as income tax,
if they work on a so-called “labor (full-time) contract.” In
fact, there is a practice a sole proprietor or a limited
company to work with a staff of sole proprietors under so
called “civic contract” (before September 1993) or “services
contracts.” Sole proprietors pay 20% of the minimum wage
social insurance tax, and declare their revenues (and income)
once a year.
Before April 1994, tax laws permitted registered businesses to
import motor vehicles at preferential rates of import duty,
and allowed businesses to write-off investment outlays in the
year incurred (cars and apartments reduced tax duties, and
                    
17Time to register is the following: for sole proprietors (SP): not more than one week; limited liability
company (LTD): not more than two weeks; joint stock company (JSC): not more than four weeks.
18 There are special licenses for trading tobacco and alcoholic beverages. There is no difference based
on whether certain business activity is conducted on own land or own real estate, all industrial-like
activities, starting, for instance, from operation of a small cafÎ, require at least 3 special permits (form:
local fire brigades, local government architect, and local section of Institute of Hygiene, the office
monitoring in-house pollution and public hygiene). Permit fees are equal to court registration fees but
this is a special registration which is due after the court procedure. The bigger the business the greater
the number of necessary permits, and the higher the costs. Again there is no full range data (first in the
country IME research on this topic is expected end of May 1996), but for a sole proprietor to open a
cafÎ or set up a small workshop the necessary time to collect the necessary permits is at least four
weeks. Submission of permits to the local government office does not mean that the license will be
issued by a provisional deadline, but the delay does not stop the applicant from operating the activity.
The smaller the venture, the less likely is immediate issue of the license by the local government office;
meanwhile the entrepreneur operates freely.
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“investment” generated losses carried over to succeeding tax
years).
Banks provided higher interest rates on accounts of physical
persons (according to Bulgarian law, sole proprietors are
physical, or non-incorporated, persons and are not required to
hold double entry books). In fact, this was an incentive for
many entrepreneurs, while participating in a limited or joint
stock company, to keep their sole proprietorship. Banks’
interest policies must be explained by the following: family
savings and properties (92% of Bulgarian citizens own their
flats and homes) were regarded as the most accessible pool of
capital; if such clients request a credit the bank has lower
costs of providing the loan due easily identifiable mortgages;
properties possessed by bigger companies and legal entities
were subject to debates on property rights.
According to NSI, in 1994 42.3% of GDP was created in the
private sector. According to balance sheets of private
companies submitted to NSI by December 31 of that year, they
possessed 5.2% of total assets. Then, the relative share of
long-term assets was two times higher in the public sector
(53.8%, compared to 22.7% in the private sector). The share of
receivables of private companies was especially high (22.6% of
overall assets). Reported financial indicators reveal that
private companies have low coverage of loans by their own
funds19  –  0.27 (while in SOEs this figure amounts to 1.4).
The dependence on lenders in the private sector is 5 times
higher (1.58 against 0.3), i.e. own funds (or equity)
represent a considerably lower percentage than the then-
required two thirds of the loan to be covered by assets owned
by the borrower. At the same time, the private sector had 47%
of overall credit in 1994. Meanwhile, the private sector share
in total profit was reported by NSI to be 6% in 1994 and 10%
in 1995.
As some analysts calculate, from 1992 on the private sector
became virtually the sole source of operational surplus in the
economy, accounting for from 67% to over 100% (depending on
the assumptions).20 Many private firms sign employment
contracts at the minimum wage rate in order to curb social
security contributions. In 1996, the private sector accounted
for 42% of all incomes, whereas its social security
contributions amounted to only 7%.
The overall decrease in GDP produced in the private sector in
1996 was smaller than the decrease in the public sector; but
even in the first months of 1997 this trend has continued.
Investments in real terms have been constantly shrinking.
1997 private sector growth expectations for the immediate
future (one year perspective) are, however, optimistic —
mainly due to the government’s determination to accelerate
                    
19 The ratio between equity and loan capital.
20Financing Government in the Transition: Bulgaria, p.59.
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privatization pace (see paragraph 5 of the Annex) and its
plans to reduce tax burden.
In 1997 positive signs are: the democratic cabinet invited
foreign privatization consultants for the Bulgarian “blue-
chip” deals (i.e. telecommunications, the petrochemical plant
in Bourgas etc.); the banks’ privatization has already started
(the control package of the United Bulgarian Bank was bought
by EBRD). The negative sides of the process are, however,
still in place and consist of the following:
£ The process is still not transparent;
£ the emphasis is still put on the “negotiations with
potential buyers,” not on auctions;
£ the sellers (different government agencies) restrict
execution of buyer’s rights through the inclusion in
privatization contracts of provisions requiring the new
owner to maintain a certain employment level and the
completion of an “investment plan” (for more details, see
below, next section);
£ the public capital market is still underdeveloped.
REFLECTION ON PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CREDITORS RIGHTS
In brief, the history of private sector capitalization shows
that Bulgaria lacks a critical mass of entrepreneurship to
both influence political initiative and lead economic growth,
investment and prosperity. Fundamental reasons for this are in
slow privatization and poorly enforced property rights.
A mid-transition overview of these issues is provided by the
World Bank special assessment of Bulgaria’s private sector
development.21 Paragraph 5 of the Annex reviews the Bulgarian
privatization experience, and demonstrates that 1997 results
seem promising. Here we would like to comment on the
enforcement of the property and creditors’ rights established
by Articles 17, 18 and 19 of Bulgarian Constitution. As has
been pointed out, constitutions influence economic efficiency
through a set of arrangements, not just provisions on property
rights but also through other basic liberties, stability and
accountability of the government machinery. 22
Regarding private property rights, Article 17 of the Bulgarian
Constitution declares their inviolability, but in a pure
juridical sense, rather than in terms of execution of these
rights. Article 18 establishes restrictions related to
exclusive monopoly rights of the government: natural
resources, coastal area and the Black Sea shelf, forests,
natural and historic preserves, radio frequencies and geo-
stationary orbit, road facilities, railroads, post and
communications, nuclear energy, military industries, etc.
Indeed, the same article requires that these rights be
executed “in the citizens’ and society’s interests” as
                    
21Bulgaria, Private Sector Assessment, World Bank Document No. 14546 BUL/June 28, 1996.
22 Jon Elster, The impact of constitutions on economic performance, Proceedings of the World Bank
annual conference on development economics: 1994, The World Bank, 1995, p. 213-224.
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established by law. Article 19 says that the Bulgarian economy
functions on the “basis of free economic initiative,” and that
the “investment and economic activities” of Bulgarian and
foreign persons are “protected by law.” Article 21 says that
arable land deserves “special protection by the state and
society,” and obligates owners to cultivate it. Article 22
prohibits foreigners from acquiring land property rights.
Thus, the part of the Constitution dealing directly with
property and economic rights contains dubious wording, which
allows for controversial interpretation and legislation.
This happened to virtually all private property regulations.
Table 3 below shows the fate of some key economic laws in the
entire reform period (1989-1997).
Table 3: Stability of the business legal frame23
Law(s)
(regulation)
First published
State Gazette No
Amendments
after 1991
Last
amendment
VAT 90/1993 6 26 June 97.
Income tax 132/1950 18 2 June 1997
Decree 56*
/Profit tax
4/1989* /
59/1996
14* / 5 2 Apr 1996*
/ 15 June
1997.
Privatization 74/1994 8 18 July 1997
Foreign
investment24
47/1991; 8/1992;
?/1997
6 22 July 1997
Implementation
rules
First published
State Gazette No
Amendments
after 1991.
Last
amendment
VAT 17/1994 4 17 Dec 1996
Income tax 100/1994 7 6 Aug 1997
Decree 56/Profit
tax
15/1989* /
109/1996
19* / 1 28 March
1997
Privatization 68/1992 6 30 May 199725
                    
23 Bulgarian legal tradition often requires that a law is supported by so-called implementation rules
established by the executive administration. Decree No 56 (full title: Decree on Economic Activities)
was a late communist era attempt to address the challenges of the economic failure of central planning.
Parts of the Decree dealing with the registration, legal form of business etc. were later (1991) replaced
by a company law; the Decree itself remained as corporate tax law.
24In fact there are three foreign investment acts; the first, the Foreign Investment Law, adopted in
1991 by the Grand National Assembly, established a legal definition of foreign investment, postulated a
permit regime and a free repatriation of profits (with a 15% withholding tax), and required US $50,000
value of the investment in order to enjoy the benefits; the second act, the Foreign Persons Economic
Activities Investment Encouragement and Foreign Investment Protection Law, was adopted in 1992
and skipped the permits and established new definitions; this act suffered most amendments related to
restrictions against foreigners owning buildings and land; In September 1997, Parliament passed a new
Foreign Investment Law which discontinues all restrictions, regards portfolio investment and know-
how brought in as an investment, and establishes different tax reliefs.
25 The Privatization Law is to be amended by the end of September 1997 in order to skip mandatory
evaluation before auctions, restructure revenues (with 74% instead of the previous 57% channeled to
State Reconstruction and Development Fund use to cover foreign debt payments and support credit
institutions), adjust privatization responsibilities (allocated according to the size of salable assets), and
discontinue some bans on trading equities.
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Foreign
investment
77/1994 4 3 June 1997
Special cases are laws to restitute urban properties (8 acts
adopted in 1992, dealing with physically existing properties —
mostly real estate — still possessed by the government, and
one act passed in November 1997 to restitute or compensate
non-urban immovable properties and equity holdings26) as well
as the Land Restitution Act. Restitution of urban property is
completed up to 80%. In contrast, the Land Property
Restitution Act was adopted in 1991 and passed four major
amendments (in 1992, 1995, and 1997), channeling the process
in opposite directions. As a result, not more than 20% will be
duly restituted to former owners and/or their heirs.
Restrictions to owners rights’ here are the requirement to
cultivate land and barriers to trading it.
In the reviewed period (1992 - first three quarters of 1997),
restrictions in privatization and post-privatization were
numerous as well. Besides the requirements to maintain
employment and stick to a contracted “investment plan”
mentioned above, regulations contained a number of
“procedural” hurdles which do not allow for moving forward
sales of public assets, including:
£ a ban on privatization funds selling equities of privatized
enterprises and/or their own shares for six months after the
last auction (without any firm idea how many auctions would
take place or when);
£ a ban on insiders (both workers and managers) and outsiders
(other corporate shareholders and creditors) selling their
shares until five years after the privatization deal is
completed;
£ a ban on voucher privatization funds acquiring more than 34%
of the shares of a given enterprise;
£ a ban on creditors accepting any assets other than real
estate as collateral;
£ a five-year ban on inside buyers selling their shares or
using them as collateral;
£ a ban on foreigners benefiting from management (or employee)
buy-out schemes,
...and this list may be continued.
Late 1997 amendments had discontinued the six-month ban on
trading vouchers and allow shareholders to sell.
Post-privatization governance seems to be a problem due to
dispersed property rights, introduced by mixed (conventional
market plus voucher privatization plus retained government
share) schemes, which prevent new owners from making changes
in the charter of association unless 67% of assets are
acquired.
                    
26When implemented the total value of the restitruted properties was
roughly estimated at 2% of 1993 GDP, the latter act is not
implemented yet, and it is difficult to have even an idea on its
economic impact.
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In the period of 1991-1997 there were many institutional
barriers that prevented execution of creditors’ rights27. The
fragmentation of the credit market brought a vicious circle:
in order to secure better payments on loans, banks require
higher amount and better quality of collateral; in order to
provide such collateral, entrepreneurs must be able to invest,
grow and achieve higher returns on capital. Until the end of
1996 there were no regulations on collateral and special
pledges. Respective laws are adopted but still not enforced.
Others, like deposit guarantee bill, are still in the pipe
line. In late 1996 and early 1997 there were developments
which allow for major improvement: a general foreclosure law
was adopted; supporting are the acts on special pledges and
private notaries; under IMF and World Bank strict sponsorship
a new bankruptcy of banks regulation was enforced. Although
special pledges registry is establishesd, there is no evidence
that these pleges have become popular among creditors.
A NOTE ON BANKS
The real banking sector reform in Bulgaria started in 1989
when the communist-era central banking had been swapped for
modern two-tier banking system with typical central bank and
59 commercial banks, most of them established from the
previous branches of the BNB. The legal framework for the
functioning of the banking system was created with the passage
of the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (1991) and the Law
on Banks and Credit Activity (1992). The total number of banks
in Bulgaria in 1990 was 70.
During the period 1994-1995 eight from nine large banks with
assets for more than 30 bln. leva were state-owned. At the end
of 1995 these 9 banks (without State Saving Bank) held 74.9 %
of all financial assets in the system.
Table 4: Bank Assets Structure
State-owned Privat
e
Foreign Total k
Oct. 1996 84.8% 12.6% 2.6% 100.0% 0.74
Nov. 1996 85.2% 12.2% 2.6% 100.0% 0.74
Dec. 1996 86.3% 11.1% 2.6% 100.0% 0.76
Jan. 1997 88.3% 8.8% 2.9% 100.0% 0.79
Feb. 1997 89.0% 7.8% 3.2% 100.0% 0.80
Mar. 1997 88.4% 7.8% 3.8% 100.0% 0.79
Establishment of private commercial banks began in 1991 and
this process was especially active until 1993. There was a
very liberal regime for licensing of the commercial banks and
low start-up capital requirements which ensured easy entry
into banking. Additionally there were no special requirements
for the origin of the funds used as a start-up capital and
many private banks started their activities with borrowed
funds. During this period legislative base of the banking in
Bulgaria was imperfect and allowed establishment of private
                    
27 See: Bulgaria, Private Sector Assessment, p. 30-33.
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banks which goal was to provide credits to their major
shareholders and/or to persons and firms, connected with these
shareholders. This was a perfect scheme for siphoning money
through BNB`s and State Saving Banks refinancing.
Table 5: Commercial Banks in Bulgaria
199
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Year-end Total 70 78 59 41 45 47 35
incl. Foreign 0 0 0 1 3 5 7
Licensed during the
year
61 8 2 7 10 4 2
incl. Foreign 0 0 0 1 2 1 2
Consolidated banks 0 0 22 29 9 3 0
Banking groups
following
consolidation
0 0 1 4 3 1 0
Revoked licenses
during the year
0 0 1 0 0 0 14
As a result of the low entry barriers into banking sector the
number of private banks increased significantly - from 2 in
1990 to 26 in 1995. Their assets to total assets of the
banking system were 3.1 % in 1992, 6.4 % in 1993, 15.6 % in
1994 and 22.4 % in 1995. In 1996 private banks`assets to total
banking sector assets decreased to 15.2 % due to loss of
public confidence in private banks.
In 1993-94 loss-making state banks were more than the private
ones and their total losses were larger as well. Nine
commercial banks (four large state banks, three small ones and
two small private banks) accounted for 79.1% of total losses
in the banking system in 1993 and for 87.2% in 1994. In 1995
the large private banks followed suit and the number of loss-
making private banks went up.
Table 6: Balance profit and losses of commercial
banks(mln.leva)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Profit 7201 2903 1896 8702 4646
Losses 1845 2291 4172 10056 29181
Net Profit 5356 612 -2276 -1354 -
24535
Number of banks with
losses
2 6 11 15 23
including private banks
and foreign banks
0 0 5 7 15
Commercial banks` losses are largely due to the bad loans.
There were two major sources of bad loans in Bulgarian banking
sector: the non-performing loans extended to the SOEs in the
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pre-transition period, and the credit expansion of the most of
the banks, and especially the private ones, after 1990.
One of factors that lead to new “bad borrowing” was the
government policy for replacing direct budget subsidies to the
real sector with quasifiscal subsidies through new credit
injections. There was no political will for closing the loss-
makers until mid-1996, and they had to be kept alive through
credit amnesties which ever deepened the crisis in the banking
sector. The only state-owned bank to avoid new doubtful
lending was Bulbank, which finally aggregated 91% of all
standard loans in end-1996.
Table 7: Structure of commercial loans 1995 - 1996
Types of
loans
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
Standard
loans
51.65 43.67 52.34 33.41 11.16 0.21
Doubtful
loans - A
41.15 33.89 31.87 22.42 85.31 86.04
Doubtful
loans - B
0.61 1.39 5.94 7.59 3.53 6.45
Uncollectable
loans
6.58 11.79 9.85 11.02 0 7.3
Loans not
subject to
provisioning
0 9.27 0 25.56 0 0
* Group 1 includes 7 big state-owned banks, amounting 67% of
the banking system in end-1996, with Bulbank and SSB included.
Group 2 includes17 small and medium size banks, amounting 7%
of the banking system
Group 3 includes 3 banks with foreign capital and 4 bank
branches amounting 2% of the banking system; the remaining 24%
stand in all banks under bankruptcy procedures initiated by
the BNB and are not included in the table
** Doubtful loans A - in arrears of less than 30 days
     Doubtful loans B - in arrears between 30 and 90 days
     Uncollectable loans - in arrears of over 90 days
Weak private sector, bad banking management, the over-supply
on the banking market, credit risk concentration, negative
structure of credit portfolios and increasing share of non-
performing credits, decapitalization of the banking system and
the following loss of confidence in the banking system,  etc.
lead to a turmoil in the banking system.
A precondition for the banking crisis was set on the beginning
of reforms in 1990 when a process of establishing deeply
fragmented banking system began with a large number of small
state-owned banks specialized in providing funds to particular
branches and regions. Almost all of them inherited significant
amount of non-performing credits extended to the enterprises
during the socialist-era. To a great extent their further
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decapitalization was due to the slow process of bank
consolidation.
One of the most serious problems that lead to the banking
crises in 1996-1997 was the one with both non-performing loans
extended to the SOEs in the pre-transition period, and non-
performing credits granted after 1990 by the most of the
banks, and especially the private ones. Some 50 % of all loans
granted by state-owned banks to non-financial institutions are
uncollectible. To a considerable extent this is due to the
influence of the state on lending to strategically important
state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, for most of the SOEs,
the only way for servicing their debts and covering their
losses became collecting new loans from banks. The
preservation of loss-making enterprises in the public sector
was government policy during the whole period.
By the end of 1995 41 % of all loans granted by both state and
private banks to non-financial institutions were
irrecoverable. Only 39 % of total lending by private banks
were regularly serviced.
The problem with most of the private banks stems from common
practice of extending credits to  related to bank`s top-level
management persons and firms. Some of them were created for
the only purpose of directing money (collected by both
deposits from the population and through refinancing by the
Central Bank) to the newly emerged private firms with no
intention of collecting the loans back.
Deterioration of banks` credit portfolio also was due to the
lack of effective legal framework concerning collection of
credits from unfair borrowers and realization of securities.
Moreover, no legal procedures for bankruptcy proceedings
against insolvent SOEs were in place.
As a result of the deep banking crisis from May 1996 until
April 1997 eighteen  banks were closed and put under special
supervision by the BNB. In May, 1996, the Bank Law was amended
and for the first time since the beginning of the reform, a
legal procedures for bank bankruptcy were introduced. In 1996,
14 banks which concentrated 24 % of total assets in the
banking system were put under conservatorship. This is
estimated to be a biggest banking crisis worldwide recently.
From 27 private banks existing by the time, the 4 biggest ones
were put under special supervision.
33 banks (including State Saving Bank and foreign banks
branches) survived, but some of them are small and private and
still have to overcome some serious problems concerning their
solvency. One of the most serious problems for small banks is
to meet new requirement for the minimal level of banking
founding capital, which have to reach 10 bln. BGL
(approximately $ 5.4 mln.) by the end of  June 1998. For most
of them the only solution is in attracting foreign investors.
The financial condition of commercial banks has improved to a
greet extent since the beginning of 1997. As a result of
depreciation of the lev and the brief hyper-inflation the
capitalization of banking system has been improved. The
depreciation of local currency helped banks to restructure
their portfolio. However some banks are still reliant on ZUNK
bonds.
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Following the new Banking Act replaced previous Banking and
Credit Act and the Basle Accords, BNB issued Ordinance 8
dealing with capital adequacy and minimal founding capital
requirements. All banks in Bulgaria are obliged to have 8 %
capital adequacy ratio at the end 1997, 10 % capital adequacy
ratio at the end of 1998 and 12 % at the end of 1999.
Recently banks can be divided into four groups. The first
group consists of UBB, Expressbank, Bulbank, Bulgarian Post
Bank, SSB, Biochim, Hebrosbank and represent 76 % of banking
system assets. At the end of June 1997 their total capital
adequacy was 8.3 %. Only two of these banks have capital
adequacy ratio below 8 %.  Net capital of this group is 187
bln.leva. For the period January-July the banks included in
this group reported 67 bln.leva profit and none of them
reported losses.
The second  group of banks includes Municipal bank, Unionbank,
First Investment Bank, Corporate Bank, Bulgarian Commercial
and Industrial Bank, International Orthodox Bank,
Creditexpress, First East International Bank, Trakiyabank,
Bulgaria-Invest Commercial Bank, Teximbank, Credit Bank,
Balkan Universal Bank, Central Cooperative Bank, Bulgarian -
Russian Investment Bank, International Bank for Commerce and
Development. These 16 banks hold 10 % of total banking system
assets.  Their total capital adequacy was 18 % at the end of
June 1997 and only four of them reported capital adequacy
below 8 %. Their profit was  17 bln.leva for the first six
months of the year. The losses of the banks in this group was
below 6 bln.leva.
Four foreign banks and five branches (ING Bank,Bayerische-
Bulgarische Handelsbank, BNP-Dresdner Bank, Raiffeisenbank,
Xiosbank, National Bank of Greece, Eurobank, Bulgarian
Investment Bank and Ionian Bank) form the third group and
represent 4.5 % of banking system in Bulgaria.
The four group consists of 10 banks which were put under
conservatorship.
Table 8: Banks’ capital adequacy under BNB Regulation No8 on
the capital adequacy
I Group
1996     June
1997
(%)
II Group
1996     June
1997
(%)
III Group
1996     June
1997
(%)
Total capital
adequacy ratio
19
8
8
18
15
19
Primary
capital
adequacy ratio
18
7
13
14
18
14
Assets risk
component
24
22
61
45
43
52
Net
capital\balanc
e assets
4
3
5
8
-9
7
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A long-run problem faced by the Bulgarian banking system seems
to be a making an adequate profit from bank activities. At the
moment the average profitability of bank portfolios is
considerably below the interest rates levels, since part of
the banks’ assets (bad loans, buildings, etc.) pay no income.
In addition banks are very conservative in their lending
activities. Banks still consider lending to be a very risky
activity because the business environment has not improved
significantly, as well as the fact that the execution of
creditors’ rights is low and banks have faced problems with
collecting on non-performing loans. This additionally
contracts the quality and variety of bank services which for
most Bulgarian commercial banks are extremely restricted and
include taking deposits, giving very short-term credits and
intermediation in payments in Bulgaria and abroad. It is
expected that future development of the capital market will
have a serious effect on commercial banks. Development of the
capital market can create additional opportunities for banks
to diversify their services by new intermediation in trade
with securities.
Interest rates have fallen essentially since March 1997. They
are likely to remain low in the next six months of year due to
the methodology for defining the basic interest rate (BIR).
The BNB reports BIR every week at the base of the average
yield obtained by the government securities with 3 months
maturity at the last auction. Currently, this market is
considered to be of largest volume. An alternative possibility
to define BIR might be the inter-bank market interest.
However, in the nearest future the volume of inter-bank
transactions would remain lower than the volume of the short-
term government securities market.
At the same time, real interest rate is still negative,
threatenning incentives to save which wre very low any how.28
Clear evidence for this is seen in the fact that in September
1997 currency outside banks exceeds total amount of time and
saving deposits.
Lack of opportunities for placement banks’ resources is
resulting in policies to keep predomonantly high liquid assets
— cash, assets on bank accounts and government securities. At
the end of August 1997, six largest banks reported BGL 22.8
billion profit. Seven small and medium banks sustained losses.
Foreign-majority-owned banks and branches of foreign banks are
also loss-making (they hold less than 5% of bank assets and an
insignificant part of banking capital).
In 1991 the number of state-owned banks was 70, most of them
were small with the statutory capital up to BGL 10 mln.
(approximately $ 500 000) with average annual volume of
credits up to BGL 250 mln. ($ 12 mln). In the same year
Bulgarian National Bank began preparation for banking sector
consolidation. The declared objective was to prevent the
banking sector from further fragmentation. In 1992 Banking
Consolidation Company (BCC) was established. The process
                    
28See the above paragraph of savings and investment.
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started in 1992 with consolidation of 22 banks in one - United
Bulgarian Bank. 12 small commercial banks were merged in
Exspressbank. In 1993 throughout merger of Vidin Commercial
Bank, Lyaskovetz Commercial Bank and Gorna Orjahovitza
Commercial Bank was established Balkanbank. Other commercial
bank established through a commercial bank merger was
Hebrosbank. It consolidated 8 banks. Also 4 small commercial
banks were merged in a new bank, named Sofiabank. With the
consolidation of Biochim Bank in 1995 the number of state-
owned banks decreased from 70 in 1991 to 11 in 1995.
 According to the agreements with the IMF and the World Bank
at the end of June was finalized the first deal for
privatization of United Bulgarian Bank. As a result 35 % of
bank`s shares were acquired by EBRD and 30 % of shares were
acquired by American Oppenheimer & Co. The remaining 35 % of
shares are in possession of Bulbank. BCC looks for foreign
investors for the other five state banks, which have to be
privatized by the end of 1998. It is expected the negotiations
for privatization of Expressbank to be concluded at the
beginning of 1998. The only potential buyer is Daewoo
Securities, although Raiffeisenbank had such plans until
recently. In process of privatization preparation are
Hebrosbank, Bulgarian Post Bank and Bulbank. It is expected
that Post Bank will be the next bank on line. According to BCC
program a tender for privatization of the bank will be
announced in January 1998. Interest to the Bulgarian Post Bank
are demonstrating Nomura Bank, The National Bank of Greece and
the EBRD. Still there is lower interest to Hebrosbank, in
which the share of the BCC is 97.5 % of the capital. A
strategy for privatization of the biggest Bulgarian Bank -
Bulbank should be ready earlier at the first few months next
year and will be offered for sale after the mid-1998.
While agreement with IMF is in place, including a provisional
Extended Fund Agreement pending negotiation in 1998, the
banks` privatization is not likely to become a reversible
process. Meanwhile, the process is politically difficult:
banks seem resistant and have already secured political
support for delays; the most likely outcome is to have banks
sold through intermediaries.
TRENDS IN TRADE: IN SEARCH OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
If we look at Bulgarian exports prior to the beginnings of
economic reform in 1990s, we will realize that it demonstrated
the highest share among ex-COMECON countries (today emerging
market leaders) to the CMEA market itself. The dynamic is
similar, due probably to purely political factors, but as a
share of total exports Bulgaria along with then-Czechoslovakia
was the last to contract CMEA-export efforts by 1989; other
countries had started reducing this trade in 1986. Another
difference is that Bulgaria exported mostly to the ex-Soviet
Union while other countries traded among themselves. According
to the calculations of Roumen Dobrinski, Bulgarian CMEA-trade
share in the second half of 1970s and 1980s averaged around
60% of the total. Closest to Bulgaria was Czechoslovakia, with
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51-52%, Romania had a less than 30% CMEA-share, while Hungary
and Poland were always between 40% and 50%.29 Dobrinski shows
that the accumulation of Bulgaria’s foreign debt coincided
with a lack of alternative export routes right in 1986, and
was related to an attempt to increase export to COMECON
countries, an attempt which obviously failed from the very
first steps if we convert the turnover into US dollars.30
Besides some sporadic attempts to impose protectionists
tarrif, in “normal” 1991-1994 years the Bulgarian Economy
demonstrated extraordinary openness, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9: International trade flows of Bulgaria as per
cent of GDP
Year Export Import Total turnover
1989 34,5 32,3 66,9
1990 23,3 22,7 46,0
1991 42,3 33,3 75,5
1992 45,6 51,9 97,5
1993 34,4 46,8 81,2
1994 41,5 43,1 84,6
Following a decrease in 1990 the percentage share of foreign
trade in the GDP became relatively stable. The data in column
2 indicate that Bulgaria was a highly open economy (for the
sake of comparison, in 1994 Switzerland’s exports/GDP ratio
was 35).31
The same is true for groups of trade partners but to a lesser
extent. The following two graphs demonstrate the group
dynamics in total exports and imports respectively. Structures
are very different at the beginning and end of the period, but
no reorientation.
G r a p h  3 :  R e l a t i v e  s h a r e  o f  i m p o r t s  f r o m
s o m e  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s
                    
29Rumen Dobrinski, Transition Failures: Anatomy of the Bulgarian Crisis, Vienna, WIIW, 1997, p.7.
30Rumen Dobrinski, op. cit., pp. 8-12.
31Source: NSI.
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G r a p h  4 :  R e l a t i v e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  t o
s o m e  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s
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Data for 1996, as they are shown in Table 8, also suggest that
there was no significant shift.
Table 10: Main partners in Bulgarian foreign trade
Country US$
mln.
Share of
exp
Country US $
mln.
Share of
imp.
Total 3587,9 79 3701,1 85.8
Italy 471,4 10.4 Russia 1401,3 32.5
Russia 462,6 10.2 Germany 536,2 12.4
Germany 419,8 9.2 Italy 299 6.9
Turkey 368,1 8.1 Greece 188,9 4.4
Greece 321 7.1 France 154 3.6
Yugoslavi
a
226,3 5 Austria 117,5 2.7
Ukraine 160,1 3.5 Ukraine 110,9 2.6
Macedonia 143,1 3.2 US 107,6 2.5
UK 134,5 3 UK 99.7 2.3
France 120,6 2.7 Turkey 90,7 2.1
US 105,7 2.3 Netherland
s
86,4 2
Spain 105,1 2.3 Iran 75,8 1.8
Moldova 87,7 1.9 Switzerlan
d
72,5 1.7
Netherlan
ds
75,9 1.7 Romania 66 1.5
Georgia 75,8 1.7 Czech Rep. 62,5 1.4
Romania 72,4 1.6 Belgium 56,5 1.3
Syrian AR 71,4 1.6 Yugoslavia 53,2 1.2
Belgium 66.2 1.5 Cuba 47 11
Egypt 52,5 1.2 Finland 38,9 0.9
Austria 47.8 1.1 Sweden 37 0.9
Source: NSI
Table demonstrates significant trading partners, i.e. with a
share of not less than around 1% share in Bulgaria’s exports
or imports.
We may draw the following conclusions. There is no champion of
the country’s exports. However, there is a “champion” in the
imports, and this is the Russian Federation: against roughly
10% exports there are 32.5% imports. This is due to the import
of energy resources and raw materials (see below, Table 12 on
commodity structure of Bulgaria’s exports), and proves that
the economy has a one-sided supply structure (mineral
resources are imported mainly from Russia and the Ukraine, and
fuels mostly from Russia.). Bulgaria’s situation reflects the
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situation in other Balkan countries. Meanwhile, some
considerable market are virtually missing: exports to France
are roughly 5 times less than those to Germany, UK or Italy.
Exports to neighboring countries exceed 17% while imports are
at the level of 9% Macedonia is totally missing from the list
of significant importers, and Turkey’s exports are four time
less than imports from Bulgaria. The longest border of the
country is with Romania, but exchange with this largest
emerging market in the region is far from being active. A
CEFTA agreement is expected by end of 1997 and is expected to
facilitate one fifth of Bulgarian foreign trade.
Broadly diversified trade with neighboring countries’ share
equals to a portion of remote ones incurs, presumably,
additional opportunity costs.
Table 11: Trade with Balkan neighbors (1992-1996)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Balkan countries--Imports (BGL
mln.)
12452.5 12288.6 27350.0 40673.7 78489.8
Balkan countries--% of Total
Imports
11.9 9.3 12.0 10.7 8.7
Balkan countries--Exports (BGL
mln.)
23252.3 28479.5 65882.6 98665.6 211680.3
Balkan countries--% of Total
Exports
25.4 27.7 30.5 27.4 25.9
Balkan countries--Net Exports
(BGL mln.)
10799.8 16190.9 38532.6 57991.8 133190.5
Greece--Imports (BGL mln.) 5818.7 4665.8 10884.0 16729.9 30792.7
Greece--% of Total Imports 5.6 3.5 4.8 4.4 3.4
Greece--Exports (BGL mln.) 4173.3 6338.8 16828.4 24760.0 61383.7
Greece--% of Total Exports 4.6 6.2 7.8 6.9 7.5
Greece--Net Exports (BGL mln.) -1645.4 1673.0 5944.4 8030.1 30591.0
Turkey--Imports (BGL mln.) 1668.5 2113.8 4444.4 6744.4 17900.0
Turkey--% of Total Imports 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0
Turkey--Exports (BGL mln.) 5766.6 7826.6 10021.6 25937.0 66900.0
Turkey--% of Total Exports 6.3 7.6 4.6 7.2 8.2
Turkey--Net Exports (BGL mln.) 4098.1 5712.8 5577.2 19192.5 49000.0
Romania--Imports (BGL mln.) 2472.4 2807.9 4327.0 4101.1 13483.8
Romania--% of Total Imports 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.1 1.5
Romania--Exports (BGL mln.) 2603.4 2542.1 3430.1 6391.8 12290.0
Romania--% of Total Exports 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.8 1.5
Romania--Net Exports (BGL mln.) 131.0 -265.8 -896.9 2290.7 -1193.8
Albania--Imports (BGL mln.) 79.3 10.2 34.9 14.3 17.1
Albania--% of Total Imports 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Albania--Exports (BGL mln.) 1230.6 1054.2 2893.4 4067.8 7051.4
Albania--% of Total Exports 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9
Albania--Net Exports (BGL mln.) 1151.3 1044.0 2858.5 4053.5 7034.3
YUG—Imports (BGL mln.) 1386.6 115.1 52.1 203.0 8507.6
YUG--% of Total Imports 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9
YUG—Exports (BGL mln.) 4022.7 3603.7 7874.2 5786.7 35420.6
YUG--% of Total Exports 4.4 3.5 3.6 1.6 4.3
YUG--Net Exports (BGL mln.) 2636.1 3488.6 7822.1 5583.7 26913.0
Macedonia—Imports (BGL mln.) 814.4 2154.5 6988.2 11826.0 5295.2
Macedonia--% of Total Imports 0.8 1.6 3.1 3.1 0.6
Macedonia—Exports (BGL mln.) 3701.3 6287.6 22294.7 29257.7 24651.6
Macedonia--% of Total Exports 4.0 6.1 10.3 8.1 3.0
Macedonia—Net Exports (BGL mln.) 2886.9 4133.1 15306.5 17431.7 19356.4
Slovenia—Imports (BGL mln.) 107.6 289.9 502.4 760.1 1434.1
Slovenia--% of Total Imports 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Slovenia—Exports (BGL mln.) 101.9 232.3 1905.7 1461.2 595.1
Slovenia--% of Total Exports 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.1
Slovenia--Net Exports (BGL mln.) -5.7 -57.6 1403.3 701.1 -839.0
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Croatia—Imports (BGL mln.) 38.4 80.0 110.9 294.9 1052
Croatia--% of Total Imports 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Croatia—Exports (BGL mln.) 356.3 347.5 628.3 997.6 2781.3
Croatia--% of Total Exports 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Croatia--Net Exports (BGL mln.) 317.9 267.5 517.4 702.7 1729.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina--Imports
(BGL mln.)
66.6 51.4 6.1 0.0 7.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina--% of
Total Imports
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina--Exports
(BGL mln.)
1296.2 246.7 6.2 5.8 606.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina--% of
Total Exports
1.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina--Net
Exports (BGL mln.)
1229.6 195.3 0.1 5.8 599.3
Source: NSI.
Data on the following table suggest other important insights,
proving the above mentioned feature of the Bulgarian economy
of being an open one. Even the leading export products involve
high import components. The leading foodstuffs export is due
to the tobacco component. The balance is categorically
positive in energy consummption and sub-product sectors. There
is not sufficient data available, but it is likely that
Bulgarian foreign trade is rather extensive. Promising is the
position in the balance of cement and ceramics, base metals
and precious metals. It is likely that, the future of these
trades would depend on barriers to access to domestic mineral
resources, i.e. on concessions regulation. There are reserve
opportunities in livestock and cattle-breeding but investment
here requires restructuring in the enforcement of land
property rights and a relatively long rate of returns.
Foreign trade under a currency board regime represents a major
challenge. If we look at countries in similar conditions,32 it
is obvious that it takes two-three years for an economy to
adjust and identify its competitiveness.
Table 12: Bulgarian foreign trade by commodity in 1996
Tota
l
exp.
Share
of
total
exp.
Total
imp.
Share
of
total
imp.
Balan
ce
TOTAL 4542
,6
100 4313.
3
100 229.3
1. Live animals, animal
products
130.
7
2.9 30.7 0.7 100
2. Vegetable products 110.
8
2.4 92.9 2.2 17.9
3. Animal or vegetable fats
and oils
17.8 0.4 20 0.5 -2.2
4. Foodstuffs, beverages,
tobacco
618.
1
13.6 210.4 4.9 407.7
5. Mineral products, fuels 408. 9 1482. 34.4 -
                    
32See: Nissan Leviathan (ed.), Proceedings of a Conference on Currency Substitution and Currency
Boards, World bank Discussion paper N 207, World Bank, 1993; Argentina, The Convertibility Plan:
Assessment and Potential Prospects, World Bank Report N15402-AR, July 12, 1996, pp. 9-11,18-21.
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9 7 1073.
8
6. Chemical products 755.
8
16.6 438 10.2 317.8
7. Plastics, rubber,
articles thereof
173.
8
3.8 162.2 3.8 11.6
8. Hides, skins, leather,
articles thereof
36.5 0.8 58.4 1.4 -21.9
9. Wood, articles of wood 76.2 1.7 19.9 0.5 56.3
10. Pulp, paper, paperboard 63.5 1.4 143.1 3.3 -79.6
11. Textiles, textile
articles
464.
2
10.2 409.4 9.5 54.8
12. Footwear, headgear etc. 107.
7
2.4 49.3 1.1 58.4
13. Articles of cement,
plaster,       ceramics,
glass
76 1.7 52.5 1.2 23.5
14. Precious stones,
metals, jewelry
17.7 0.4 4 0.1 13.7
15. Base metals, articles
thereof
815.
6
18 257.2 6 558.4
16. Machinery, appliances,
electrical equipment
460.
1
10.1 582.2 13.5 -
122.1
17. Transport equipment 126.
1
2.8 164.4 3.8 -38.3
18. Precise apparatus and
instruments, optical goods
19.3 0.4 85.8 2 -66.5
19. Arms and ammunitions 0.3 2.1 -1.8
20. Miscellaneous
manufactured       articles
63.6 1.4 47.9 1.1 15.7
Source: Ministry of trade and tourism.
THE BUREAUCRATIC FACTOR
In trying to assess the prospects of Bulgarian reform,
emerging-market analysts fail to take into account
bureaucratic factors. But these were the factors that blocked
reforms under the previous administration, and which played a
major role during the “Technocratic” (1993-1994) and socialist
(1995-1997) cabinets. Focusing only on macroeconomic
indicators, one may grasp the results of the reintroduced
reforms but lose the ability to foresee developments which
could stem from the current government’s role as a privileged
market maker. In the past, such developments were: high formal
and informal taxation, high capital and transaction costs, and
non-transparent rules and decision-making procedures. The
government has obtained discretionary powers in virtually all
segments of the market, and the administration in Bulgaria has
an extraordinary opportunity to control all instances of
access to capital and factors of production. The results are
known: capital flight, disinvestment, virtually no foreign
investment and no incentives to growth.
Besides these purely historical reasons, there are forthcoming
areas of reform in which the administration still has to play
a decisive role:
1. given the fact that the economic growth and prosperity path
has been enforced by the circumstances of economic failures
of previous governments, the 1997-1998 government still has
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to secure originally not very articulated choice of this
path;
2. given the lack of “critical mass” of entrepreneurship and
corporate citizenship to support reforms and lead growth, it
must broaden public support for the reforms and facilitate
the emergence and use of entrepreneurship culture;
3. given constitutional heritage, it has to enforce private
property rights, the rule of law and prudent practices in
finance and banking services;
4. given the unidentified competitiveness of the Bulgarian
economy, the government should maintain liberalization of
all walks of economic life except the currency board, and
elaborate a vision on Bulgaria’s place in the regional and
global markets.
5. given the administrative tradition, it should put an end to
discretionary and distributive practices of the government.
The current democratic government’s predecessors, especially
the socialists, believed they would benefit from
redistributing resources. Sticking to tradition, they have
been replacing SOE managers and boards with their fellow-
partisans, stopping privatization to gain from insider
trading. Electricity prices, cheap labor and fuel, as well as
quasi-fiscal subsidies were believed to maintain competitive
prices for Bulgarian exports. Exporters were licensed or
controlled by the government, and domestic producers were
protected by different tariff barriers. Whoever wanted to cut
gains from price differences between domestic and foreign
markets had first to please the government. The system worked
somehow for twelve months, from February 1995 to February
1996, but was doomed to fall apart. There were clear
incentives to take and keep gains outside the country. But
Bulgaria has a working, though malfunctioning, democratic
rule: all channels to block reforms received a legal
foundation. If not profoundly reshaped these foundations will
again work against growth and prosperity.
The democrats were elected on the ticket of a reform consensus
and have a clear mandate to proceed as fast as possible. They
have the backing of both domestic and international public
opinion. Apart from a few instances related to central banking
and finance — areas closely monitored by the IMF and World
Bank — the democrats have the disadvantage of lacking
bureaucratic experience: key administrative posts were a
preserve for true believers and party-fellows who were not
corrupted yet but might be spoiled by the system if it were
not abolished.
While macroeconomic dimensions of 1997 and the IMF agreement
so far provide grounds for an optimistic outlook there are
systemic sources of corruption which need to be addressed.
1. The key tool for direct government officials involvement
economic affairs is procurement of “state property rights.”
Rules here were established by the Council of Ministers’
Decree 7 of January 1994, which replaced an older regulation
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(Decree 265 of January 1992). Articles 10 and 11 of Decree 7
stipulate that in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) sole
proprietor’s rights are to be exercised by the line ministries
and committees (those of industry, trade and tourism,
agriculture, energy, post and telecommunications, etc.), and
by the Council of Ministers (in the case of military
industries). In fact, the prime mister and the cabinet are
“sole proprietors” of last resort due to their control over
the line ministers acts. Line ministers appoint the SOEs’
managers and board members at their discretion. Members of the
central administration are not allowed to sit on the boards of
more than two enterprises, although there is no limit for
members of parliament. There is no competition requirement or
any provision to contract out managerial teams or use venture
capital schemes. All government line-ups Bulgaria has had in
the last seven years have preferred to bring in fellow-
partisans, thus paying them back for political services and
loyalty. The new government sticks to this tradition by
retaining minority share in privatised enterprises, thus
keeping administration appointees as board members.
2. Governance of state monopolies suffers from old diseases.
Government seems slow in deregulating energy, post,
communications, roads and transport. NEC determines on its own
what its conditionally fixed costs are, the costs which allow
NEC enterprises to function as if there is no consumer. The
oil refinery has no outsiders to measure so-called
technological losses. Any concrete judgment on corporate
governance issues is difficult, due to regulations which
declare any information on the major monopolistic enterprises
to be a state and national security secret.
3. Another important source of corruption in Bulgaria has been
price controls and quasi-fiscal subsidies. Given the currency
board regime, the latter have practically no place. The
government reduced subsidies to 0.1% of GDP. Price controls on
consumer goods were abandoned thanks to high inflation in 1996
and early 1997. However, the democrats declared they will
abandon control on electricity prices by 2002. Such policies
may hamper prospects to investment in utilities and economic
growth already in 1999, a year which seems crucial for long-
term growth scenarios (see below section on economic
scenarios). At the same time, the new administration re-
established price controls in the form of controls over
trading contracts. It issued Decree 269 of June 1997, which
requires producers and wholesale merchants to determine the
final “contractual” (in fact, retail) price of a product. The
intention is to eliminate wholesale intermediaries. City
police, under joint leadership of trade and interior
ministers, have flooded commodity markets asking merchants to
“prove” that their contracts are “correct.” This regulation
deals with “contractual prices” of only fifteen consumer
products, mostly foodstuffs, and it is hardly possible to
implement. But the actual damage is that it both induces
populist expectations by the public at large and creates a
wide-spread source of
 petite corruption. Commodity exchanges
and wholesale markets have existed already for six-seven
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years. Last year, the socialists adopted a law creating the
Government Commodity Exchanges and Wholesale Markets
Commission, comprised of nominees of the Council of Ministers
but no merchants, and no self-regulatory procedure. The
democrats did not amend the regulations but appointed
commissioners, and commodity traders to apply for a license.
4. In all above cases there is common denominator: a general
etatist philosophy of the new administration. It is especially
visible in more sophisticated walks of the economic reform,
e.g. in capital market regulations.
5. Control over domestic commodity markets motivates merchants
to try to export goods if they can find a better price for
them in neighboring countries. “Fighting smugglers” has been
the government’s excuse for sticking to complicated customs
procedures and delaying the abolishment of tariff barriers,
although the latter job is basically completed.
6. In the field of infrastructure, the new government amended
the concessions regulations (initially adopted in November
1995 but not enforced). A positive development is that
amendments overcome some constitutional restrictions; it would
be possible to: acquire a concession on all construction and
road facilities built before by the government and on electric
distribution networks and mineral, natural and water
resources; build new facilities; and obtain a concession to
investigate and explore natural resources. The new regulations
allow the buyer to exercise concession rights in an interim
period until concession contracts are being arranged; these
rights are determined by the privatization contract, and the
interim period cannot be longer than three months.33 In
addition, the act stipulates procedures omitted in the
previous arrangement: 85% of concession revenues are being
channeled to the central budget, and the rest remain in a
separate off-budget account to cover the costs of concessions;
the funds are being spent under the supervision of the Council
of Ministers; the term of the concession (not more than 35
years but subject to prolongation automatically) enters in
force as determined in the contract; and there is no
possibility for newly-established (after the act was adopted)
state companies to obtain a concession. Exploration and
exploitation consessions on mineral resources are largely
still  missing or restrictively regulated. What matters,
however, in terms of discretion, is the right of the
government to provide a concession without an auction or any
sort of competition. Three months after the act was adopted,
i.e. by November 1, 1997, line ministries are required to
propose to the Council of Ministries solutions to all
inherited privatization cases where a special concession
arrangement is needed. The Concession Act itself leaves a lot
of important details (the size and the term of investment,
construction rights etc.) to be specified in the concession
                    
33Absence of such provisions has been considered one of the key impediments to some major
privatization deals, e.g. the Sodi-Devnya deal (largest privatization transaction of US $162 million) was
postponed twice due to banned concession on a soda-dash mine, the key supplier to the plant
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contract, while containing few or no guidelines for what
grounds on which to select concessionaires.
Bulgaria has been very slow in negotiating oil and gas pipe-
lines and communication cables which may cross its territory
and allow use of the country’s absolute advantage of
geographic location. Besides some progress in communication
networks, pipe-lines were the most disadvantageous case of
Bulgaria’s reform attempts in the recent years. They have
resulted in nothing but internal political tensions and
raising Russian (official and private, transparent and hidden)
influence on Bulgarian affairs. A key deficiency in this
respect was the inability of the Bulgarian government to
negotiate with Russia and Greece. The very approach to
negotiations has been based on the wrong assumption that these
are governments that establish and fulfill agreements; the
Bulgarian government was in fact contacting other government
institutions which, in their turn, were representing huge
companies and/or vested interests. Thus, the Bulgarian
position has always been the weaker one, especially given the
one-sided resource dependence of the Bulgarian economy on
Russia (see import/export ratios with Russia). The result is
that in 1996 and 1997 natural gas supplied from Russia to
Bulgaria has been on average US $15 per ton more expensive
than to Western Europe, while transit distance is shorter.
As in the case with other huge companies and monopolies, e.g.
Netional Electric Company, the government has for the time
being just replaced board members. Conflicts of interest have
been reduced: Neftochim’s executive director is no longer
executive manager of the major supplier Rosbulneft (a joint
venture with Rosneft). But again, as in other cases, newcomers
have limited professional experience. They failed to organize
auctions for crude oil supplies to the refinery and lost more
than two months in orientation, delaying restructuring the
management and accounting procedures. At the same time
suppliers succeeded in fixing prices and boycotting auction
proposals. If the cabinet is at all seeking support for its
pipe-line and infrastructure efforts, it is from International
Financial Institutions and other government or multilateral
organizations The only way to avoid traps of future links
behind the front stage is to invite trans-national
corporations to initiate, finance and implement projects on
Bulgarian territory. Simultaneously, the Bulgarian government
still has to learn how to avoid or reduce geopolitical risks
by relying on private corporate, but transparent interests.
Such learning seems difficult and slow.
The most important institutional constraint is the currency
board regime. Another factor which would work against
bureaucratic factor is the agreement with IFIs. Both factors
will block populist temptations threatening interruption of
support to the Bulgaria’s balance of payments. Although 1997’s
scheduled privatization revenue of $350 million is likely to
be exceeded thanks to several large deals, new SOE boards may
attempt to delay privatization. There are indicators that
targeted privatization of 25% of total state assets will not
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be accomplished without stricter requirements on behalf of
IFIs. The bureaucratic factor is likely to bring slow
adjustment of the Bulgarian economy to international markets
and thus, to diminished prospects for growth and prosperity.
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PART TWO
ECONOMIC SCENARIOS: BULGARIAN ECONOMY IN 1997 / 1998, AND
BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
There are two notions of the so called Tequila-effects: a)
[portfolio] investors pull-out expecting unfavorable
developments, and b) impacts of such capital flows from other
economies. Here we are trying to examine these and two other
scenarios namely: 1. Investors Pull Out; 2. Negative Other
Emerging Economies Impact; 3. Growth Prospects and Advantages;
4. Regional Infrastructure: Failures and Provissional
Successes. In addition we attempt to evaluate their inter-
connection and draw respective recommendations to avoid
negative developments. The methodology we use and principles
to select scenarios are explained in paragraph 10 of the
Annex.
1. INVESTORS PULL OUT (TEQUILA - 1)
The importance for Bulgaria of different notions of Tequila
effect stems from the open character of the economy and the
role of foreign debt as a constraint to domestic decision-
making.
As mentioned before, the stabilizing effect of the currency
board regime was felt partially before it was actually
introduced in July 1997. The BGL stabilized at the level of
1,500 per US $1 in March and later depreciated with the
Deutsche Mark by about 11-12%. Attracted by the prospects of
high yields (due to the interest rate of 18.2% a month,
political turbulence in late December 1996 and January 1997,
and prompt, peaceful and negotiated outcome of the political
crisis which opened opportunities for agreement with IFIs to
support the country’s balance of payments), foreign portfolio
investors took the risk and brought about US $300 million into
the country, according to IME estimates. This happened in
January and early February, but already by April 28 the
interest rate (determined by that of 3-month T-bill yields)
had fallen to the level of 6.2% monthly, and to 3.59% a month
by May 26.34 Having no opportunity to invest in equities (due
to the absence of an institutionalized capital market), they
withdrew their investment and left with respective gains of
about US $80-120 million in May and June, before the
introduction of the currency board.
Thus, Investors Pull Out, or the first aspect of the Tequila
effect has in fact happened, on a small scale, without causing
any instability. There is no reason why the same might not
happen again with more severe impact in the future, and that
                    
342nd week of September 1997 interest rate is 6.11%.
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is why it is important to know why it happened easily this
time:
1. the first factor was the very size of the investment;
2. the second was the level of savings outside banks,
approximately US $ 1 billion.
Citizens and corporations have bought dollars for everyday use
during the winter and kept them, changing several million a
day thus not allowing the exchange rate to sky-rocket when
investors converted their local currency gains into hard
currency ones. This was not credibility in the system which
worked, but it shows that the level of savings (the
credibility) would have a decisive role in the future. Another
factor has to do with the general environment which, in fact,
has limited the size of investment.
Future similar effects would depend on the ability of the
Bulgarian economy to grow. They are outlined in our third
scenario. However, one of the factors to influence growth rate
and concern both portfolio and strategic investors is
identified liabilities of the Bulgarian economy. Figures
reflecting Bulgaria’s foreign debt payments reveal the
following picture.
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Table 1: Scheduled external debt service by creditors 1999-2004 (USD millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Amortization
(total)
651 584 812 566 537 558
IBRD 51 66 70 74 87 95
EBRD/EIB 32 42 47 52 35 33
IMF 137 200 295 157 38 14
G-24 172 115 83 20 0 0
Bilateral 38 58 72 86 101 98
Bonds 32 18 0 0 0 0
Other Commercial 7 7 2 0 0 0
Commercial Bank 0 0 10 20 40 50
London Club 0 0 16 111 190 222
Paris Club 182 178 217 46 46 46
Interest payments
(total)
519 486 523 479 456 443
IBRD 61 62 63 60 58 56
EBRD/EIB 18 21 22 23 24 27
IMF 61 47 33 13 2 2
G-24 26 10 1 0 0 0
Bilateral 18 20 21 22 21 20
Bonds 1 0 0 0 0 0
Other Commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commercial Bank 3 7 14 17 19 19
London Club 277 281 364 342 332 319
Paris Club 54 38 22 3 0 0
Total Debt Service 1170 1170 1335 1045 993 1001
Source: Andrew Kenningham, op. cit. p.18
The Bulgarian economy would need to produce around US $1,120
of surplus every year, only in order to meet its foreign debt
obligations. This amount is roughly 10% of the 1996 GDP when
it contracted by almost 11%.
An additional factor to be taken into account is the level of
domestic debt services. A currency board regime presupposes
that there is no essential difference between foreign and
domestic debt, except agreed foreign debt payments’ (Brady and
other provisional debt-restructuring deals) seniority.
However, a problem stems from the BGL pegging to the DM: part
of the domestic debt is USD denominated and amounts to $950
million; it appreciates its value with the depreciation of the
DM against the USD; thus 10% annual DM depreciation (as is the
case in 1997) would lead to ten percent increase of the
dollar-denominated debt.
Graph 1 shows 1997 domestic debt services at the level of 7%
of GDP, but at the end of 1998 payments become low, and if
there is modest growth in 1998, the domestic debt can hardly
pose a major threat to the currency board regime, given the
fact that next year’s external balance is covered by new
borrowing from IFIs.
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Graph 1: GDP/Domestic Debt Interest Payment
Interest Payments on Domestic Debt (% GDP)
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Source: Andrew Kenningham, op. cit. p.18.
Some grounds for assessment of prospects for growth is
provided by the following two tables, allowing comparison
between Bulgaria and other transition countries with a
currency board.
Table 2: Current account balance, 1991-97e (USD millions)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997q1 199
7f
Exports 3737 3956 3727 3935 5345 4724(1145) 460
0
  - change 5.9 -0.7 5.6 35.8 -11.6 -
2.6
Import 3769 4169 4612 3952 5224 4580(766) 415
0
  - % change 10.6 10.6 -14.3 32.2 -12.3 -
9.4
Trade
Balance
-32 -212 -885 152 122 144 (379) 350
Current
Account
Balance
-77 -361 -1098 -45 -25.6 -
22.3
(235) 350
  - as % GDP -11.7 -12.6 -14.7 -2.5 2.6 1.6 (17) 3.8
Table 3: Current Accounts Under Currency Board (% GDP)
Years after Introduction of Currency Board
0 1 2 3 4 5
Argentina (1991) - 0.4 -2.9 -2.9 -3.3 -0.9 -1.8
Estonia (1992) 3.1 1.3 -7.0 -4.6 -10.11
Lithuania (1994) -2.1 -2.3 -2.0
Source: Andrew Kenningham, op. cit. p.18
Current account balances in countries with a currency board
regime show dynamics. It seems that it makes no difference
whether it is a country emerging from a central planning past
or an emerging market in general. In the case of Bulgaria a
factor which may have an impact on export abilities is the peg
to the Deutsche Mark, if the latter drastically depreciates
against US dollar. As is obvious from the third scenario we do
not think such a development is likely.
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2. NEGATIVE OTHER EMERGING ECONOMIES IMPACT (TEQUILA - 2)
Bulgaria is a small but open economy. The fact that it has
chosen the Currency Board regime as a stabilization tool is a
good protection measure against external shocks. But the
currency board system will work as a stability and shock-
preventing factor if and only if other economic institutions
are intrinsically flexible to adjust to the changing regional
(Balkan) and global environments.
In 1997 and 1998 the real challenge in this respect would
rather stem from domestic economic policy patterns. If the
government fails to:
£ liberalize trade,
£ establish transparent privatization and capital markets
rules,
£ promote sound and prudently run financial sectors,
£ skip entry barriers for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs,
then the currency board regime will not be able to perform its
preventative functions.
Besides its openness, Bulgarian economy remained virtually
untouched during October - November 1997 crisis of the global
capital market. The explanation is in the underdeveloped
nature of the Bulgarian stock market; in the unclear supply
and doubtful demand side of this market.
Supply-side is hampered by the limited information disclosure
on the stocks offered, or by the low quality of the
information. Fixing this problem would require at least six -
eight month work of the Securities and Stock Exchange
Commission and the Parliament. Also, there is a limited number
of resource companies which already have placed shares
(Bulgartabak) or are likely to offer shares on the exchange
(like, say, BTC). Additional problem is constituted by the
fact that potential sellers would rather prefer to avoid entry
barriers and use OTC market, this is especially true for the
voucher funds, holding about 13% of the assets. FDIs (Solvey,
Union Minier etc.) do not seem willing to place equities on
the local stock exchange given opportunities to raise funds
internationally.
The demand is not developing due different factors: portfolio
investors have already bitter experience because of missing
protection of minority shareholders; banks are restricted to
acquire equities in the real sector and debt-equity swaps have
been limited by number of regulations; investors interest is
diminished by the lack of information and unclear gains’
prospects.
Bulgarian economy is likely to remain self-protected from
shocks comming from volatility of global stock markets, due
underdevelopment and the price is likely to be less FDIs and
slower growth.
On the regional (Balkan) level this would mean lost economic
opportunities. The latter should be considered in two levels.
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The first is a scenario according to which emerging economies
in the region fail to proceed with market reforms. This has
already happened in Albania after a relatively good start (see
tables paragraph 1 of the Annex, Bulgaria and Other Transition
Economies) in the early 90s, but accompanied with under-
development of financial services. The Yugoslav Federation,
despite its potential, has relatively low prospects for
economic growth in the coming three-four years. A customs
union is scheduled for January 1998 between the Yugoslav
Federation and FYR Macedonia, which would mark a new market of
about 12 million. It would be a rather self-sufficient market
in terms of food-stuffs and basic consumer goods. It is likely
that this market will establish protection tariffs against
other Balkan emerging markets.
However, this market would have disadvantages vis-a-vis
Bulgaria, namely:
£ Bulgaria’s domestic market still enjoys lower prices (the
price levels for food and agriculture products will equalize
by the end of 1998 or early 1999);
£ lower labor costs;
£ likely stability backed by 1997-1998 balance of payment
financing by IFIs while the Yugoslav Federation (not
Macedonia) will be lacking such an external constraint to
populist economic policies;
£ last but not least, this petite common Balkan market is
vulnerable to civic unrest and/or disorders.
Bulgaria’s advantages come from a lower starting point and the
higher social costs of transition paid by the Bulgarian public
(see paragraph 9 of the Annex). Although the hardest time has
passed, by the year 2000-2001 Bulgaria will be a provider of
an idle but well-trained and educated labor force. By the end
of 1998 unemployment is expected to reach 17-18% due to the
liquidation of loss-making SOEs.
A special case in point is Romania. It had a reform start
similar to Bulgaria in 1997 but it is a market three times
bigger (22.2 million), which has attracted more foreign
investment in absolute terms (per capita figures are
comparable, see paragraph 1 of the Annex) and which is passing
through a similar political transition as Bulgaria. in 1997.
The advantage of Bulgaria is the more united leadership of the
country.
If the “neighbor-failure” scenario develops it would mean that
Bulgaria’s political and currency stability are a self-
sufficient asset in the short run. The necessary way to
convert this short-term asset into a long-term one is to
reduce transaction costs and keep them lower than in Romania.
However, as is obvious from the section on savings and
investment, the Bulgarian economy still has to identify its
competitive advantages, a process which is related to
privatization, restructuring and the implementation of the
general liberalization policies listed above. If the latter
could proceed within a one-year term (up to mid or late 1998),
privatization and restructuring would bring about results in
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terms of identification of competitive advantages by the year
2000, and after. (Meanwhile, the impact on productivity and
employment is likely to be immediate due to the
underdevelopment of the private sector.)
A threat related to this scenario is that initial stability is
considered to be a self-sufficient institutional advantage.
The second sub-scenario may deserve the name of “neighbor-
success.” The peculiarity here is that it could not take place
within a neighborhood of isolated countries and economies. In
general terms it requires:
£ low tariff barriers;
£ a competitive market environment;
£ free exchange of goods, services, capital and ideas;
£ utilized market potential of about 58 million (without
Turkey);
£ a well-functioning infrastructure;
£ easy accessibility to all the sights and corners of the
Balkan peninsula,
and ensures long-term growth and prosperity for most or all
countries in the region.
To achieve this, a joint strategy is needed to increase
competitiveness not only of individual countries but of the
region as a whole, which means involving Turkey and its
neighboring countries, and to promote infrastructure projects
on mutually beneficial ground.
This scenario is deeply rooted in the political and historic
backgrounds of the countries in the region, and for this
reason is rather unlikely. This does not mean that efforts to
proceed along these line are worthless. There is even a chance
to succeed, but it will depend on two factors:
1. support of the international community,
2. and, development of the regional infrastructure.
Respective efforts should aim at facilitated access to outside
markets and of outside capital to local markets and cross-
country cooperation, operation of businesses and specific
industry sub-sectors, and need to pass the following stages:
£ facilitated trade through lowering tariff and non-tariff
barriers
£ macroeconomic and political stability
£ cross-regional infrastructure projects
£ compatible financial and capital markets regulation
£ joint strategies to strengthen regional competitiveness.
If this scenario is not realized, Bulgaria would at best enjoy
modest growth rates of 3% to 4% per annum. The same would be
the result if some mixture of these two sun-scenarios proves
more realistic. Then the Bulgarian market will be squeezed
between two big neighbors, Romania (22 million) and Turkey (65
million), of which the latter is self-sufficient.
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3. GROWTH PROSPECTS AND ADVANTAGES
The economic growth problem appears to be a crucial one in the
years after 1998. Some analysts, drawing an analogy between
Balkan and East Asian emerging markets, envisage two
scenarios: 4.54% annual growth and 7% growth for the next 25
years. The calculation is on the current PPP as an analog to
that of Singapore 25 years ago. If it is correct, Bulgaria
would enjoy either 15 times growth of GDP per capita or 27
times growth in the coming 25 years.35
Table 4: Inflation in 1997
Januar
y
Februa
ry
March April May June July Augus
t
43.8% 243.7% 12.3% -0.7% 5.6% 0.8% 3.7% 5.5%
Source: NSI
The first 1997 stabilization results demonstrate surprisingly
fast curbing of  inflation, a speed which is not known from
the experiences of other currency board systems in Central and
Eastern Europe. However, on an annual basis inflation is
estimated at 536%, with an unclear tendency in the summer
months. The effect of DM-depreciation on Bulgarian production
competitiveness was eliminated by increased aggregated costs
in the economy. This should be regarded as an indicator of a
need for structural support for stabilization efforts,
probably requiring prompter privatization than that which is
targeted for 1997 and 1998 in the government’s agreement with
the IMF and the World Bank.
In other words, 1997 and 1998 are still important in terms of
preparation and confirmation of the economic development path.
Without a path being chosen and embarked upon, any long-term
scenario should involve speculation on the human factor.
Table 5: Bulgaria 1998-2010: IME forecast
Year Populati
on
GDP
Growt
h
Rate
(%)
GDP
bln
DM
GDP
bln
USD
GDP
per
capita
DM
GDP
per
capita
USD
PPP
deflat
ed GDP
DM
PPP
deflat
ed GDP
USD
Ext.
debt
paymen
ts USD
% of
GDP
PPP
1998 8600000 3 16635 8317 1934 967 6973 3486 959 11,53 3,604
8
1999 8587500 3 17134 8567 1995 998 6710 3355 1170 13,66 3,363
3
2000 8575000 3 17648 8824 2058 1029 6458 3229 1170 13,26 3,138
0
2001 8556000 3 18177 9088 2124 1062 6220 3110 1335 14,69 2,927
7
2002 8537000 3 18722 9361 2193 1097 5991 2995 1045 11,16 2,731
6
2003 8518000 3 19284 9642 2264 1132 5770 2885 993 10,30 2,548
5
                    
35Richard Beilock, op. cit. p. 9-11
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2004 8499000 3 19862 9931 2337 1169 5557 2778 1001 10,08 2,377
8
2005 8480000 3 20458 10229 2413 1206 5352 2676 n.a. n.a. 2,218
5
2006 8442000 3 21072 10536 2496 1248 5167 2583 n.a. n.a. 2,069
8
2007 8404000 3 21704 10852 2583 1291 4987 2494 n.a. n.a. 1,931
2
2008 8366000 3 22355 11178 2672 1336 4815 2407 n.a. n.a. 1,801
8
2009 8328000 3 23026 11513 2765 1382 4648 2324 n.a. n.a. 1,681
1
2010 8290000 3 23717 11858 2861 1430 4487 2244 n.a. n.a. 1,568
4
In reading the figures in the table it is important to note
that, as the National Statistics Institute forecasts, the
average annual population decrease is likely to be 19,000 in
the period 2000-2005, and 38,000 in 2005-2010. Also, we assume
that in the period in question the DM/USD exchange rate would
fluctuate around the 2 to 1 level, or if a major deviation
appears then its possible negative impact (through US dollar
structure of Bulgarian imports) would be compensated through
economic (real sector, not monetary) adjustments.
Compared to Asian emerging markets, Bulgaria has no clear
statistics as to how much of the population is below the
absolute poverty line, and thus it is not possible to
speculate on the impact of poverty on growth prospects. It is
obvious, however, that PPP is more equally distributed in
Bulgaria than in those countries and, presumably, would
require policies which ensure that members of the society
experience economic growth and prosper “as if together.”
Table 6: Per capita GDP and incidence of absolute poverty:
Southeast Asia, 1970 and 1994
Country Per capita GDP
(1994 USD)
Percent of
Population in
absolute poverty
1970 1994 1970 1994
Thailand 420 2210 50 22
Malaysia 820 3520 30-35 41974
Singapore 4300 23360 n.a. n.a.
Source: Richard Beilock, op. cit. p 8.
A scenario similar to that of IME has been proposed recently
by Prof. Richard Beilock. It is based on the assumption that
Bulgaria has the competitive advantage of a more educated
labor force than Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.
Table 7: Prof. Richard Beilock’s (AUBG) forecast for the next
25 years
Year GDP per capita
(growth rate of
4.54% per annum,
constant 1994 PPP
of 4.38)
GDP per capita
(growth rate of
7%  per annum,
constant 1994 PPP
of 4.38)
PPP deflated
GDP per capita
(under 4.54%
annual
growth)***
PPP deflated
GDP per capita
(under 7%
annual
growth)***
1998 4230 4230 3481,38 3481,38
43
1999 4422 4526 3395,59 3475,49
2000 4623 4843 3311,92 3469,62
2001 4833 5182 3230,31 3463,76
2002 5052 5545 3150,70 3457,90
2003 5281 5933 3073,07 3452,06
2004 5521 6348 2997,34 3446,23
2005 5772 6792 2923,48 3440,40
2006 6034 7268 2851,44 3434,59
2007 6308 7777 2781,18 3428,78
2008 6594 8321 2712,64 3422,99
2009 6894 8904 2645,80 3417,20
2010 7207 9527 2580,60 3411,43
2011 7534 10194 2683,26 3630,61
2012 7876 10907 2805,08 3884,76
2013 8233 11671 2932,43 4156,69
2014 8607 12488 3065,57 4447,66
2015 8998 13362 3204,74 4758,99
2016 9406 14297 3350,24 5092,12
2017 9833 15298 3502,34 5448,57
2018 10280 16369 3661,35 5829,97
2019 10747 17515 3827,57 6238,07
2020 11235 18741 4001,34 6674,73
2021 11745 20052 4183,00 7141,97
2022 12278 21456 4372,91 7641,90
2023 12835 22958 4571,44 8176,84
Source: Richard Beilock, op. cit. p. 9-11.
According to professor Beilock, Bulgaria is likely (whatever
the growth rate) to be the most prosperous country of today’s
transition Balkans.
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In the IME forecast, we are trying to adjust GDP per capita
figures in nominal terms to the amount of goods and services
one can buy with them. By doing so, we attempt to estimate
possible changes in the standard of living that will occur
even after optimistically assuming a stable positive growth
rate. Calculation of the PPP for the period is based on the
assumption that liberalizing international trade and
converging price levels go hand in hand.
However, some differences will remain. We assume that in 12-13
years (the term of the forecast) the PPP level in Bulgaria
will be equal or at least similar to that in Hungary in 1994,
which was 1.55-1.60 (compared to the USA). Also, we assume
that it will progressively reach that value, starting from the
1994 figure of 4.38. Using that formula, we calculated the
1998 PPP to be about 3.6.
The main reasons for choosing Hungary are as follows:
1. Comparability in terms of size and population
2. Lack of mineral resources, and therefore comparatively
inelastic imports, in both countries
3. Foreign trade counts for a substantial share of the GDP in
both countries
4. Lack of domestic credit resources and therefore dependence
on foreign investment
5. Both countries are net agricultural exporters; therefore.
food prices will remain lower than in other countries even
after a complete trade liberalization.
In general, we see Bulgaria now on the track that Hungary was
on during the last decade.
Under that assumption, the PPP adjusted GDP per capita
decreases from $3486 to $2244. The nominal per capita GDP, at
the same time, increases by some 48%, from $967 to $1430.
Therefore, tradable goods will become cheaper for local
consumers, while non-tradable goods will become more and more
expensive. This may, and probably will, lead to changes in the
structure of consumption. To conclude, increased GDP per
capita does not immediately lead to an improved living
standard.
Prof. Beilock’s projection is, in our view, too optimistic in
two ways. We shall not comment on his forecast for 4.54% or
even 7% annual GDP growth, based on the Southeast Asia case.
But it is necessary to test his assumption that the 1994 PPP
level will remain steady for the next 25 years. Even now, in
1997, it is far below 4.38 (the 1994 level). All of the
measures undertaken after the introduction of the currency
board, and the currency board regime itself, require further
liberalization of prices and reduction and even abolishment of
any projectionist policies. By mid-1997 almost all energy
prices were adjusted to international levels (except for
central heating), and the prices of most tradable goods are
already comparable to those in Western Europe. Moreover,
Bulgaria’s medium- and long-term goal is joining the EU, which
means abolishment of all barriers to trade and to free flow of
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capital, resulting in convergence of prices of goods and
service.
After deflation at the above-mentioned decreasing PPP rate,
Prof. Beilock’s forecast looks far more realistic. The results
are shown in column 4 and 5 of Table 7.
46
4. REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
This scenario is interrelated with the second sub-scenario,
Other Emerging Economies Impact. Success or failure of
Bulgarian economic participation in regional infrastructure
development might be crucial not only for regional cooperation
and prospects for the “neighbor-success” scenario but for
Bulgaria’s individual success in economic and political
reforms. Similar would be the impact on FYR Macedonia,
pressing the government in Skopje to closer ties with the
Yugoslav Federation. As a “young” nation it is not likely to
develop relations with Bulgaria on the same basis. For
Bulgaria, however, this means skipping all barriers to free
trade with Macedonia, making all concessions related to the
so-called “national pride” issue in order to ensure better
positioning of the economy in the regional context. Whatever
the external developments, Bulgaria does not seem in a
position to take sides in regional conflicts due to its
considerably weaker military spending as a percentage of GDP.
If there is something which may induce indigenous security in
the Balkans, it is the development of regional infrastructure.
While it is difficult to envisage a development of common
market institutions, regional infrastructure seems both to be
a trade imperative and to be to everybody’s benefit. The
necessity of infrastructure projects has received political
support from the EBRD, EIB and Southeast European Cooperation
Initiative.
The economic argument in favor is that Balkans have an
economic structure similar to the Bulgarian exchange with
Russia: with almost the entire energy and resource supply in
coming from the East; the Balkans are the only European sub-
region with a one-sided gas and oil supply. Where does
Bulgaria stand in this context?
As mentioned earlier, Bulgaria has been unfortunate in
negotiating natural gas prices with Russia.
Some gas and petrol pipelines cross Bulgarian territory: 65
kilometers of gas pipeline on Serbian territory and 40
kilometers on Bulgarian territory are missing to connect
Bulgaria’s gas-network with that of the Yugoslav Federation;
there is no petrol pipe-line between the two countries; there
is a gas pipe-line with Macedonia, Greece and Turkey, going
respectively to Skopje, Athens and Istanbul; a gas-pipe-line
is missing to link Bulgaria’s network with the Greek port of
Kavala; and petrol lines are largely missing.
Road infrastructure is again interrupted on Bulgarian and
Yugoslav territory, if we consider the Belgrade -Istanbul
(West-East) route (highway is missing between Nis and Sofia,
and is unfinished between the Northern Thracian city of
Plovdiv and Turkey’s border town of Kapu-Kule; North-South and
Black Sea - Adriatic highways do not exist at all, besides
parts of the Macedonian road network.
Virtually any kind of infrastructure is missing on Albanian
territory. There is no connection between Romanian and
Bulgarian gas pipe-lines, nor between Macedonian and
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Yugoslavian ones; a gas pipe-line goes from Belgrade to Bosnia
but there is no link to Croatia (Croatia is supplied from the
Adriatic via Slovenia).
Electricity supply networks have been established according to
the COMECON “division of labor,” and are attached to Russia
and Central Europe, but not as part of inner-Balkan
infrastructure. Meanwhile, in 1992 Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia established an inter-government coalition
to link themselves to the West-European electricity
transmission network, which was accomplished two years ago.
Balkan countries have hardly tested the waters for
negotiations on electricity transmission reorientation and
inner-Balkan links.
Optic cable nets between Bulgaria and all neighboring
countries have been established in 1996 and 1997.
It is obvious that an economic growth scenario embedded in
regional infrastructure would mean extraordinary investment
opportunities. Previous failure may be converted into success.
However, given poor initial conditions and monopolistic
legislation and structures, projects in any of the fields do
not seem feasible earlier than 1999. This is exactly the year
when the Bulgarian economy would need its substantial
investment boost.
Lack of domestic resources in Bulgaria and other Balkan
transition economies may be compensated for through foreign
corporate financing. Just recently, the AMBO Consortium
(“AMBO” stands for Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria Oil pipe-line)
announced its plans to build a crude oil pipe-line between the
Bulgarian port of Bourgas and Vlora in Albania. The investment
idea behind the project is simple: in 4-7 years the Black Sea
is to be flooded with crude oil on the East side, but on the
West side the only way to the Mediterranean is via the
Bosporus; companies that invested in the Caspian area (the
Baku and Tengiz oil fields), Chevron, Mobil, Lukoil and some
others, will bring the oil to the Russian Black Sea port of
Novorossiisk and Pati in Georgia, but still have to take it
out of the Bosporus to the West. On the same grounds lies the
entire importance of the Balkan region, and economies here
could succeed or fail in mediating meta-regional
infrastructure.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A) Concerning Investors Pull Out scenario:
As soon as general credibility in the Bulgarian banking system
is restored, alternative investment opportunities should be
established through the development of capital market
institutions. Although the total amount of capital flows into
the global emerging economies last year reached almost US $240
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billion.36, The Bulgarian share in it is negligible (see
foreign investment and economic comparison
paragraphs in the Annex). Bulgaria may benefit from its
virtual absence from the investors map in previous years, but
given the size of the economy any unfavorable conditions could
hamper growth prospects.
B) Concerning Negative Other Emerging Economies Impact and
Regional Infrastructure Failures and Successes:
Trade and customs fights in the region may worsen the
investment climate, block cross-country exchange and reduce
prospects for growth. Individual countries’ industries are
doomed to remain small, non-competitive and vulnerable to
bigger capital pressures unless there occurs natural
enlargement of their markets and economic potential. Equally,
local capital and people are doomed to leave the countries of
the region, unless macro-stability and prospects for growth
are established. It is not possible to follow the path of
competitiveness without fulfilling the classical pro-
investment market requirements. Strategy to enhance
competitiveness and use advantages would come through business
exchange and cooperation; they cannot be imposed from outside
or from above. For the same reason, internal and cross-country
partnership between governments and businesses is needed.
International institutions may facilitate the implementation
of this vision.
Instrumentation of the positive side of this scenario would
require:
£ negotiations to reduce barriers to trade;
£ prompt privatization and issue of formal private property
titles in individual countries;
£ elimination of financial and capital markets fragmentation
within individual countries;
£ sound monetary policies and strong bank supervision;
£ facilitation of foreign banks’ access to local markets;
£ adoption and enforcement of anti-trust regulation;
£ reducing barriers to entry and exit, both on the individual
country and regional levels;
£ fiscal and decision-making decentralization;
£ transitional infrastructure projects;
£ investment in human capital.
C) Concerning Growth Prospects and Advantages
Most of the above-mentioned policies apply here as well. If
implemented, they are expected to contribute to a high rate of
growth. High rates of growth may lead to a repetition of the
Estonian example, which in the last two years has reached
double-digit rates of economic growth and the currency board
regime has less freedom to react to provisional unfavorable
conditions restricting the money supply boosted by foreign
                    
36“Fragile, handle with care” (the Economist survey on banking in emerging markets), Economist,
April 12, 1997, p. 6.
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investment. Factors which would act against such development
are expected to be slow administrative reform and difficult
conditions on the regional level. The best strategy is to
pursue high growth rates and prepare currency board exit
policies. At any event however, the currency board should be
considered both as a long-term institutional solution which
prevents populist temptations and as a stability instrument
against negative political developments in the region.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION:
FACTORS TO REDUCE COUNTRY RISKS IN THE SHORT-TERM
As mentioned earlier, a key factor is the currency board
system. Besides this, supporting factors are as follows:
1. IFIs have a major role in Bulgarian economic decision
making, and in the short run would restrict populist
policies and force country to speed up reforms;
2. Bulgaria has no choice but to compete with neighboring
countries to attract foreign investment;
3. Bulgaria has no alternative leadership, and the incumbent
one is the most market oriented, enjoying high approval
rates;
4. for the first time in its transition history Bulgaria has
all sections of its government dominated by a market-
oriented political party;
To these we may add a “bureaucratic factor:” the Bulgarian
government may still attempt delays in privatization,
reduction of transaction costs and enforcement of private
property and contracts, but the economy has no room for
maneuvering.
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ANNEX: ECONOMIC INFORMATION
1. BULGARIA AND OTHER TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Table 1: Selected CEE countries’ 1991-1996 real GDP
growth (%)
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Esti
mate
1997
Proj
ecti
on
Bulgaria 0.5 -
9.1
-
11.7
-
7.3
-
2.4
1.8 2.6 -
10.0
-4.0
Estonia -
1.1
-8.1 -
7.9
-
14.2
-8.5 -
2.7
2.9 3.3 4.0
Lithuani
a
1.5 -
5.0
-
13.4
-
37.7
-
24.2
1.0 3.1 3.0 4.0
Macedoni
a
-
9.9
-
12.1
-
21.1
-
8.4
-
4.0
-1.5 3.0 5.0
Poland 0.2 -
11.6
-
7.0
2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 5.5
Romania -
5.8
-
5.6
-
12.9
-
8.8
1.3 3.9 6.9 4.3 -2.5
Russia -
13.0
-
14.5
-
8.7
-
12.6
-
4.0
-6.0 1.5
Slovakia 1.4 -2.5 -
14.6
-
6.5
-
3.7
4.9 7.4 6.8 5.0
Slovenia -
1.8
-4.7 -
8.1
-
5.4
2.8 5.3 3.9 3.5 4.0
Czech
Republic
1.4 -
0.4
-
14.2
-
6.4
-
0.9
2.6 4.8 4.0 4.0
Hungary 0.7 -
3.5
-
11.9
-
3.1
-
0.6
2.9 1.5 0.5 2.5
Source: EBRD, Transition report update, April 1996, Transition
report update, 1997
Table 2: CPI average annual percent change in selected CEE
countries (1989-1996)
51
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Esti
mate
1997
Proj
ecti
on
Bulgaria 6.4 26.4 339 79 64 122 33 311 690
Estonia 6.1 23.1 304 954 36 42 29 16 12
Lithuani
a
1.5  5.0 345 1,16
1
189 45 36 13 13
Macedoni
a
115 1,93
5
230 55 9 1 3
Poland 251.
0
585.
8
60 44 38 29 22 19 15
Romania 1.1 5.1 223 199 296 62 28 57 100
Russia 2.0 5.6 144 2.31
8
841 203 131 22 17
Slovakia 2.3 10.8 58 9 25 12 7 5 6
Slovenia 1.30
6
550.
0
247 93 23 13 9 9 8
Czech
Rep.
2.3 10.8 52 13 18 10 8 9 8
Hungary 17.0 28.9 32 22 21 21 28 20 18
Source: EBRD, Transition report update, 1997
2. INSTABILITY OF THE BULGARIAN TRANSITION GOVERNMENT
Each new government experimented with new ideas. Table 3 shows
the frequency of government changes and the respective
political party affiliations of presidents and prime
ministers.
Table 3: Sequence of Bulgarian central governments: 1989-1997
Event/month President Cabinet
(PM)
President/PM’
s political
affiliation
event/person/
year/period
BCP Coup (Nov.’89) Mladenov Atanasov BCP Mladenov: Nov. ’89-
July”90
Atanasov: Feb.’87-
Feb.”90
Constituent Assembly
elections (Jun ’90)
Mladenov Lukanov BCP/BSP BSP wins;
Lukanov: Feb.-Oct
’9037
Parliamentary
appointed president*
Zhelev Lukanov Zhelev: UDF
Lukanov: BSP
Zhelev: Aug. ’90-
Jan.’92
Coalition Zhelev Popov Popov: Popov: Dec. ‘90 -
                    
37According to the Bulgarian Constitution, a PM in resignation acts as incumbent head of the administration.
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(Dec.’90)38 unaffiliated Oct.’91
General & municipal
elections (Oct.’91)
Zhelev Popov Popov:
unaffiliated
UDF wins; Oct. ’91
Presidential
elections (Jan.’92)
Zhelev F.
Dimitrov
UDF (minority
government)
Zhelev wins: Jan. ‘92
-Jan.97
Dimitrov: Nov.’91-
Oct.92
Experts’ cabinet Zhelev Berov Berov:
unaffiliated
Dec. ‘92-Sept. ’94
Caretaker cabinet Zhelev Ms.
Indjova
Ms. Indjova:
unaffiliated
Sep. ‘94-Jan. ’95
General elections
(Dec.’94)
Zhelev Videnov Videnov: BSP BSP wins;
Videnov: Jan. ‘95 to
Dec. ‘96
Presidential
elections (Oct./Nov.
96)
Zhelev Videnov BSP Stoyanov wins;
Jan.’97-39
Caretaker cabinet Stoyanov Sofianski UDF Feb.’97-May’97
General elections
(Apr.’97)
Stoyanov Kostov UDF UDF  wins;
Kostov: May 97-40
The average life-span of Bulgaria’s transition cabinets has been less then 11 months, and this
is taking into account sometimes important internal reshuffling in different cabinets. Table 17
below shows what this meant for the stability of economic regulations. It is obvious that with
one exception of eleven months’ minority democratic government, the country was ruled by
different forms of coalitions involving socialists, or by socialists themselves from 1990. The
socialists, however, did not enjoy any period of simultaneous control over the presidency,
legislature and executive administration. The political meaning of this fact is that voters never
allowed the socialists to unilaterally run the country. This has helped Bulgaria’s democratic
system to create a judiciary according to multi-party constellations, and proved to be an
important achievement. In 1995 and 1996 alone, the Constitutional Court declared 32 acts of
Parliament to be wholly or partially unconstitutional; a good 75% of the discontinued
provisions were in violation of private property rights. At the same time, Bulgaria has passed
through nine sets of executive administrations, and relatively long periods of weak and non-
reformist governments. As is shown in the analysis of recent political trends, before early
1997 only the socialists had had full majorities in the legislature. What matters now in terms
of economic policy prospects is that voters for a second time give a full mandate to the
democrats, that this is happening after an unquestioned failure of the socialists, and that this
vote comes after an interim period of the UDF-affiliated cabinet of Mr. Sofianski.
                                                          
38 Negotiated due to lack of constitutional procedures.
39Five year mandate.
40Four year mandate.
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3. 1992-1996 DYNAMICS OF THE BULGARIAN MACROECONOMIC SITUATION
Table 4: Selected macroeconomic indicators: 1992 - 199641
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Nominal GDP (BGL mln.) 200832 298934 550514 867691 1660237
Real GDP Growth (%) -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9
Dollar Exchange Rate
(BGL/USD, year average)
23.34 27.65 54.25 67.17 175.82
Inflation (CPI, %) 79.5 63.9 121.9 32.9 310.9
GDP per capita--BGL 23516 35284 62243 103222 198538
GDP per capita--USD 1008 1276 1147 1537 1129
Industrial output--Share of
GDP (%)
40.5 35.0 32.1 33.6 32.6
Agricultural output--Share
of GDP (%)
12.0 10.6 12.3 13.9 11.7
Services--Share of GDP (%) 47.5 54.4 55.6 52.5 55.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Industrial output--Growth
(%)
-8.2 -6.2 6.0 -5.4 -8.3
Agricultural output--Growth
(%)
-14.5 -30.2 9.5 14.5 -18.1
Services--Growth (%) -20.7 0.6 -3.1 -0.7 -6.5
Private Sector--Share of
GDP--Industry (%)
4.3 6.4 7.1 9.4 9.2
Private Sector--Share of
GDP--Agriculture (%)
6.9 7.7 10.2 11.1 9.2
Private Sector--Share of
GDP--Services (%)
15.3 23.8 25.0 27.8 29.0
Private Sector--Total Share
of GDP (%)
26.5 37.9 42.3 48.3 47.4
Money supply--M1 (mln. lv.) 37833 48303 75131 107886 236628
Money supply--Broad Money
(mln. lv.)
158567 234072 418009 583663 1310275
BNB's Forex Reserves (USD
bln.)1
0.9 0.7 1 1.2 0.5
Unemployment (%) 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)1 5.3 11 6.6 5.7 10.3
Budget Expenditures (% of
GDP)1
n.a. n.a. 44.7 41.7 46.9
Domestic Debt (% of GDP)1 n.a. 31 52 38 23
Foreign Debt (USD bln.)2 12.1 12.5 10.4 10.5 9.7
Debt Service Ratio1 n.a. 16.3 12.6 10.4 17.3
Average Monthly Salary in
the Public Sector--BGL
2047 3231 4960 7537 13269
Real Income (previous year 107.6 95.2 88.8 91.3 68.5
                    
41Source: NSI, except for 1 (Andrew Kenningham, Bulgaria: Leveraging off the Deutsche Mark
(Economic Outlook and Fixed Income Investments), Merrill Lynch, July 1997) and 2 (OECD
Economic Surveys: Bulgaria 1997, p.58).
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=100)
Total Imports (BGL mln.) 104281.2 131523.1 227010.3 380012.1 905612.9
Total Exports (BGL mln.) 91532.9 102877.4 216194.4 359663.6 818315.0
Net Exports (BGL mln.) -12748.3 -28645.7 -10815.9 -20348.5 -87297.9
Net Exports as Share of GDP
(%)
-6.3 -9.6 -2.0 -2.3 -5.3
Terms of Trade Index n.a. 108.8 100.8 97.6 93.9
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4. EXTERNAL DEBT AND THE BRADY DEAL: BACKGROUND
External debt is one of the major problems faced by the
Bulgarian economy at present. It is considered to be a serious
obstacle to economic transformation in the country. At
present, external government debt amounts to US $9.861
billion, which exceeds the annual GDP of the country. Out of
this amount, a little bit over US $3.0 billion are credits
from official creditors, and the rest from private creditors.
The high debt is not only a source of significant disturbance
for the economy, but also reduces opportunities for autonomous
macroeconomic policy and makes the government susceptible to
pressure from its official creditors, in particular the IMF
and World Bank.
In March 1990 Bulgaria declared a moratorium on servicing its
external debt. A year later it started negotiations with the
creditors from the London Club. After three years of
negotiations, in July 1994 Bulgaria signed a Brady deal for
reduction and restructuring of its debt to the London Club.
Thus it reduced its US $8.16 billion debt to Brady bonds with
a face value of US $5.1 billion. Twenty percent of the debt
was bought at 25 3/16 cents per 1 dollar debt. Three types of
bonds were issued: Discount Bonds (DISCs), Front-Loaded
Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRBs) and Interest Arrears Bonds
(IABs). All types of Bulgarian Brady bonds are callable at par
at any coupon date. Bulgaria can repurchase bonds at any time
via public offerings or open market transactions, if there has
not been prior payment default on any of the Brady bonds.
A special clause envisages additional interest of 1/2% to be
paid for the Discount Bonds under certain circumstances. This
will be enforced if the GDP exceeds the Bulgarian GDP in 1993
by over 25% for two consecutive years.
Two of the Bulgarian Brady bonds can be used as a payment
instruments in privatization deals. The regulations are
considered to be comparatively liberal, with few restrictions.
DISCs are swapped at par value and FLIRBs at 50% of their par
value.
There is practically no internal market for Brady bonds, due
to existing bans in the foreign exchange regime. Bulgarian
Brady bonds are traded mainly by non-Bulgarian financial
institutions. Most Bulgarian banks have limited opportunities
for access to the international market and do not have any
significant Brady bonds portfolio. The largest holders of
Brady bonds are Bulbank, The Bulgarian-Russian Investment Bank
and some banks for which bankruptcy procedures have lately
been opened. External trade in Bulgarian Brady bonds is
totally dominated by trade of Latin American bonds, and there
is some divergence only in cases of extreme risk of default,
as in the second half of 1996 and the beginning of 1997.
A scheme was invented for evading restrictions on citizens’
investment in Brady bonds. They are now hindered by both
restrictive regulations and high nominal face value of the
papers. The scheme is called “Foreign exchange deposits,
collateralized with Brady bonds.” These allow for citizens
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virtually investing in Brady bonds that are part of the banks’
portfolios. The risk of the investment remains with the banks,
which pay a fixed interest rate, related to the income on the
Brady bonds.
Bulgaria is not only a big debtor, but it also has to collect
almost US $3 billion in debts, mainly from developing
countries and ex-CMEA countries. The debt from Iraq alone
exceeds US $1.6 billion. Libya is second on the list, with US
$360 million. The major debtor, Iraq, recognized its debt in
1991, but the imposed embargo prevented its servicing.
Flexible schemes for collateralizing the debt against new
credits, cessions, or triangle operations are the probable
fate of this debt. Collecting these receivables is a priority
now, given the problems in financing debt servicing.
The Brady deal allowed for a significant reduction (48%) in
the debt to the London Club creditors, making it one of the
mast favorable to the debtor country Brady deals signed so
far. Still, in the middle of 1996, for the first time after
the moratorium on foreign debt payments in 1990 there was a
consistent threat that the unfavorable macroeconomic situation
in the country and deficient foreign financing might result in
a default on servicing the Brady bonds — something which would
be a precedent in Brady bond history. Signing an agreement
with the IMF turned out to solve the immediate threat. State
reserves were diminished to the utmost minimum after payments
in the beginning of 1997. The fate of the forthcoming payments
will be determined by support from international financial
institutions and incomes from the privatization process — the
only reliable financial sources in the near future.
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Table 4. Gross Foreign Debt as of December 1996 (mln. USD):
Indicator mln.
USD
Gross foreign debt (A+B) 9860.9
A. Long-term debt 8545.5
guaranteed by the state 8269.2
not guaranteed by the state 276.3
I. Official creditors 3056.1
International financial institutions (inclusive of
the debt to IMF, WB, EU, EBRD, EIB)
1689.3
Bilateral (inclusive of the debt to the Paris club) 1366.9
II. Private creditors 5489.4
Bonds (inclusive of the Brady bonds and the bonds
issued by Bulbank)
5213.1
Commercial banks 402.0
Other private creditors 61.4
B. Short-term debt 1315.4
guaranteed by the state 1011.0
not guaranteed by the state 172.2
I. Creditors from the former CMEA 964.8
II. Commercial banks 175.9
III. Other private creditors 174.7
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Table 5: Bulgarian Brady bonds
Discount Bonds Front Loaded
Interest
Reduction Bonds
Interest
Arrears Bonds
Date of
issue
28 July 1994 28 July 1994 28 July 1994
Maturity
date
28 July 2024 28 July 2012 28 July 2011
Par value USD 1.850 bln. USD 1.658 bln. USD 1.611 bln.
Interest
payments
6-month
LIBOR+13/16
Years 1-2: 2%
annually; 3-4:
2.25%; 5: 2.5%;
6: 2.75%;  7:
3%; 8-18: 6-
month
LIBOR+13/16
6 months-
LIBOR+13/16
Payment
dates
Semiannually,
on 28 January
and 28 July
Semiannually,
on 28 January
and 28 July
Semiannually,
on 28 January
and 28 July
Amortizati
on
Bullet 8 years grace
period,
followed by 21
equal semi-
annual
installments,
starting in
July 2002
7 years grace
period,
followed by 21
semi-annual
installments,
starting in
July 2002:
Years 1-6: 1%
Years 6-11: 3%
Years 12-16: 6%
Years 17-21: 9%
Collateral Principal
secured by US
zero-coupon
bonds;
12 month
interest
rolling
guarantee on 7%
Principal
secured by US
zero-coupon
bonds;
12 month
interest
rolling
guarantee until
2001 - 2.6%
initially,
income on
collateral
retained until
it covers 3%
none
Denominati
on
USD 250 000 and
integral
multiples
thereof;
USD 1 000
multiples for
transfer of
beneficial
interest
USD 250 000 and
integral
multiples
thereof;
USD 1 000
multiples for
transfer of
beneficial
interest
USD 250 000 and
integral
multiples
thereof;
USD 1 000
multiples for
transfer of
beneficial
interest
Form Registered and Registered and Registered
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bearer’s bearer’s
Debt
equity
conversion
100% of par
value
recognized as
payments in
privatization
deals
50% of par
value
recognized as
payments in
privatization
deals
none
Prices as
of March
1997
63-1/8 45-5/8 61-1/8
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5. PRIVATIZATION PROGRESS: BACKGROUND
The privatization process in Bulgaria is very slow. Its delay
was one of the main reasons for the aggravated economic crisis
in 1996. However, there are some indicators that privatization
will be accelerated in 1997, not only in the real sector but
in the bank system too.
The privatization process in Bulgaria began after Parliament
passed the Privatization Law in May 1992. In practice,
privatization started in 1993, when the first deal was made.
Privatization includes cash privatization of state-owned and
municipality-owned firms, as well as restitution of both types
firms to their original owners and the Mass Privatization
Program. Municipalities are mostly involved in privatizing
small-scale enterprises (they own about 90% of all small-scale
enterprises). Small-scale privatization takes place mostly in
construction, tourism, trade, transport and other services.
Responsibility for the cash privatization of state-owned
enterprises is divided among the branch ministries and
committees and the Privatization Agency.
The progress of privatization in Bulgaria may be evaluated
only by the number of the concluded deals or by the proceeds
from them. Unfortunately, information is not yet available
about the share of privatized fixed assets. However, according
to some opinions their share was less than 10% by the end of
1996.
The Bulgarian experience with privatization can be divided
into two periods:
1993 - July 1996: Slow and Small Privatization
Privatization in this period was largely limited to small
firms. In the very beginning of the period this was due to the
large amount of time needed for the preparation of large-scale
deals and because the normative base in the privatizing sphere
was not adopted by that time yet. The delay of large-scale
privatization after 1995 was due to the tacit reluctance of
the socialist government to accelerate it (in spite of the
elaborated annual programs). By the end of July 1996, 4,128
enterprises (898 state-owned and 3,230 municipality-owned)
were privatized. The bulk of them are small-scale ones (about
95%).
The share of GDP produced by the private sector (both
privatized and new enterprises) increased from 35.4% in 1993
to 44.7% in 1995.
August 1996 - February 1997: Willingness for Acceleration
The socialist government tried to accelerate the privatization
process after the second half of 1996 as a way to cope with
the aggravated economic crisis and because of the requirement
of the IMF to implement a vigorous restructuring program.
During this period some relatively big deals were made (the
sale of “Sheraton-Sofia,” “Sodi-Devnya,” “Plama” in Pleven,
etc.) and privatization procedures were started for others
(BTC, “Chimco” in Vratsa,  etc.).
In this period (up to March 21, 1997), 1,302 enterprises (252
state-owned and 1,050 municipality-owned) were privatized.
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The mass privatization process had been launched — its first
tender was made in November 1996, and the second in March
1997. It is provided that the final tender will be made by
October 1997, which means that the acquired shares from the
people and the privatization funds may be sold six months
after that (this according to recent legislation, which
probably will be changed by the next parliament). The
participation of the people, who are eligible to claim their
mass-privatization vouchers, was below that expected: about
45% (about 2.9 million people).
£ The total financial effect from the cash privatization of
state-owned enterprises in the 1993 - March 1997 period is
BGL 284.174 billion (about US $1.600671 billion), of which:
BGL 87.814 billion (about USD 518.368 million) = contacted
payments; BGL 68.341 billion (about USD 341.597 million) =
undertaken corporate liabilities; BGL 9.646 billion (about
USD 98.545 million) = paid corporate liabilities; and BGL
118.374 billion (about USD 642.161 million) = contracted
investments.
£ The predominant types of selling during the period 1992-1996
were sales to working teams (about 37% of the total);
auctions (about 37% of the total); direct negotiations with
potential buyers (about 14% of the total); and tenders
(about 10% of the total).
£ Only about 1.3% of the privatization deals were concluded
with foreign physical and juridical persons.
£ 18.4% of arable land had been transferred from the ownership
of state and collective farms to its original owners by the
end of 1996
Data on Total Financial Effect - 1993 - November 30,/
1997 (in Mln. US$)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Direct financial
effect, incl.:
72.185 232.81 181.919 427.874 487.404 1390.89
1
Payments
contracted
44.233 144.252 113.702 184.764 460.812 947.763
Corporate
liabilities
undertaken
12.702 32.956 57.553 218.297 25.463 346.971
Corporate
liabilities paid
15.249 55.602 10.665 13.512 1.129 96.157
Indirect effect
(Investments
contracted)
58.971 201.738 151.914 170.561 781.775 1364.95
9
Total effect 131.156 434.548 333.833 587.134 1269.17 2755.85
0
Source: Privatization Agency
6. 1997 Privatization
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Data on cash privatization Jan.01.1997 - Sept.12.1997
Privatiz
ation
Agency
Other state
bodies under
art. 3*
Total
1. Finalized deals with state
and municipal property - total
1226
1.1. Number of deals with state-
owned companies - total
53 293 346
1.1.1. Manager-employee’s
buyouts
23 186 209
1.1.2. Others 30 107 137
1.2. Number of deals with
municipal bodies
880
2. Financial result - total (in
billion BGL)
680.616 110.891 791.50
8
2.1. Direct financial effect 611.443 77.298 688.74
1
2.1.1. Direct payments 591.434 61.413 653.14
7
2.1.2. Corporate liabilities
undertaken and paid
20.009 15.584 35.593
2.2. Investments contracted for
the period up to the end of 1997
(in billion BGL)
69.173 33.594 102.76
7
3. Employment 16493 10322 26815
3.1. Retained jobs 15690 5653 21343
3.2. Newly created jobs 803 4669 5472
Source: Privatization Agency
Number of deals contracted by state bodies - January 1993
- 30 November 1997
Year State bodies under
Art. 3
Line Ministries and
Gov. Committees
Privatization
Agency
Enterpri
ses
Separate
Assets
Enterpri
ses
Separate
Assets
Enterpri
ses
Separate
Assets
1993 21 41 17 34 4 7
1994 88 77 67 62 21 15
1995 105 204 84 156 21 48
1996 158 357 110 259 48 98
1997 241 210 196 185 45 25
Tota
l
613 889 474 696 139 193
Source: Privatization Agency
Number of deals by sectors - January 1993 - 30 November 1997
Trade 405 27.0%
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Industry 331 22.0%
Agriculture 272 18.1%
Construction 146 9.7%
Transport 140 9.3%
Tourism 127 8.5%
Others 81 5.4%
Total 1502 100%
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7. BULGARIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION
Two periods of industrial development
There are two clearly discernible periods in the history of
Bulgarian industry. The first period covers the interval
between the end of the nineteenth century, when Bulgaria
became an independent state, and 1945. The second period is
between 1945 and 1989.
During the first period Bulgaria was a typical agrarian
country. Industry accounted for 5.5% of GDP up to the 1930s.
Agriculture accounted for more than 50% of GDP.
The Bulgarian economy registered high real growth between
1935-1945. Industry increased by 41.2% within this period. It
was the highest growth in comparison to the other branches of
the economy, and changed the branch structure of output.
Table 5: GDP by branches (%)
Agricult
ure
Arts
&
craft
s
Industry Transport &
communicati
on
Trade Banking &
insurance
Other
s
1930 55.9 7 5.5 2.4 6.5 3.9 18.8
1945 54.1 6.1 9.4 3.6 9.9 2.4 14.5
Source: Dr. Asen Tchakaloff (In Bulgarian)
The National Income and Outlays of Bulgaria
Sofia, 1946, p.116
Industrialization started in Bulgaria in 1935. There were two
factors which lay behind the high real growth in the period
1935-1945. First, the combination of high world prices for
grain and food crops between 1935 and 1938. Second, rearmament
in 1934 led to a higher growth of industry, especially
textiles, leather-working, and the rubber industry, after
1934.
Industrialization
Industrialization was the key word after 1945, up to 1989. The
big metallurgical and chemical plants were built within 30
years. Industry accounted for the better part of domestic
product.
Table 6: Percent of GDP by branches
Year Indust
ry
Constructi
on
Agriculture
& Forestry
Transport &
Communicatio
n
Trade Other Total
1988 70.3 8.2 10.1 5.4 4.1 1.9 100
Source: National Statistical
Institute
Recent developments
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Bulgarian industry experienced its sharpest decrease in 1990
and 1991. Machine building, electronics, and the chemical
industry accounted for most of the decrease in output.
The liberalization of prices at the beginning of 1991 was the
first step toward a market economy. Since then the successive
governments have failed to introduce hard budget constraints
on industrial enterprises. Instead they have broadened the
number of industrial goods subject to price controls in order
to reduce the inflation rate. Administrative price setting had
a very harmful effect on industry. More than sixty percent of
imports are for intermediate consumption. The controlled price
of outputs and world prices of inputs deteriorated the
financial position of those industrial enterprises which
import their inputs. The mismatch between domestic and world
prices underpinned increased arrears to suppliers of the
biggest oil-processing plant in the Balkans, Neftochim Corp.
Recently, the refinery has been working at fifty percent of
its capacity.
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Table 7: Industrial output (BGL mln.,  prices 01.91)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
January 7932,1 7394,
4
4973,
0
3361,
7
3083,
7
3125,
0
3578,
5
3833,3
February 8796,8 8337,
1
4173,
7
3339,
0
3268,
7
3351,
9
3956,
7
3810,7
March 10344,7 9425,
8
5197,
9
3638,
5
3476,
5
4213,
0
4452,
5
4092,3
April 9684,7 8995,
7
4820,
9
3615,
7
3459,
2
3812,
4
4015,
6
3798,7
May 8794,5 8076,
3
4254,
4
3148,
3
3334,
5
3627,
6
4175,
8
3892,6
June 9195,1 7820,
5
3905,
0
3202,
1
3356,
7
4142,
2
4314,
9
4305,4
July 7953,6 6963,
6
4045,
8
3090,
0
2812,
6
3609,
8
4240,
2
4047,0
August 7488,5 6453,
6
3553,
5
2812,
0
3073,
0
3548,
7
4197,
0
3885,1
Septembe
r
8137,4 6666,
3
3701,
8
3233,
7
3093,
3
4383,
0
4432,
8
3762,6
October 8176,6 7282,
3
4282,
0
3744,
7
3180,
3
3946,
3
4488,
1
3988,3
November 8009,9 7164,
7
4281,
5
3505,
8
3809,
9
4136,
2
4654,
7
4236,3
December 7107,0 6161,
1
4140,
8
4672,
2
4241,
4
5058,
5
4282,
3
4318,1
Source: NSI and IME assessment
Industrial output did not achieve its 1989 level. Capacity
utilization is at about sixty percent, according to the
National Statistical Institute. The prospects for Bulgarian
industry are closely correlated with the success of
macroeconomic stabilization, which is to be implemented in May
1997. Provided that the economy achieves stability, the
prospects for Bulgarian industry are much brighter than they
now seem.
Table 8. Bulgarian external debt servicing in 1997
c Payments in mln.
USD
London Club 250
European Union 400
Paris Club around 200
CMEA banks 100
Others 40
Total: 992
Source: IME
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Bulgaria has never been considered the most attractive of the
Central and East European countries with regard to investment
opportunities. It is far behind countries such as Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Poland. A few important factors have
contributed to the low level of interest from foreign
investors: political instability, legislative instability,
corruption at all levels of administration, slow privatization
procedures, poor telecommunications, underdeveloped financial
institutions and capital market, and the overall unfavorable
macroeconomic environment.
These factors inevitably hindered the inflow of capital to
Bulgaria, and limited investment in the country for the past
six years to a total of US $831 million. A significant
proportion of this money was directed towards traditional and
well-developed branches, such as machine building, the
chemical industry, textile industry, food-stuff industry,
tourism and transport. There is investment interest in
telecommunications (the monopoly Bulgarian Telecommunications
Company is offered for sale), mining, and other sectors. The
biggest foreign investors in the country are Germany (28% of
total investment), Holland (10%), Great Britain (7.75%), USA
(6.7%), Switzerland (6.35%), Greece (6%), Austria (5%), and
others.
Compared to other CEE countries, the legislative framework of
foreign investment in Bulgaria is liberal, without any serious
legal barriers. The Law on Encouraging and Protection of
Foreign Investment deals with the most important issues.
Foreign legal and physical persons are generally granted a
national treatment for operation in the country. Foreign
investment needs to be registered by the Ministry of Finance,
and in some cases by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
It is divided into three groups: portfolio investments (on
tradable financial instruments), long-term credits, and direct
investment (in all other cases).
In order to be recognized by the law and hence to be subject
to its protection clauses, a foreign investment must exceed US
$ 50,000. The property rights of foreign investors are
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guaranteed by law and by the Constitution. There are virtually
no restrictions on the transfer of profits and capital, except
for in cases when Brady bonds were used as a payment
instrument in a privatization deal.
There is only one serious restrictive measure, namely the ban
on owning agricultural land. Investment in a limited number of
strategic branches is subject to a special authorization by a
specialized body.
Bulgarian law envisages several types of opportunities for
investment in the country: privatization, green field
investment, various forms of cooperation, joint ventures and
portfolio investment. Privatization is divided into cash and
mass privatization. The latter is implemented through
investment vouchers, used as payment instruments.
Privatization funds serve as intermediaries in this process
and offer foreign investors the opportunity to participate in
the process of mass privatization.
The greater share of investment has been made through cash
privatization. The biggest privatization deals have so far
been the sale of one of the leading European carriers, SOMAT,
the chemical plant Sodi-Devnya, and a few big hotels and
breweries. Some of the leading companies that have already
invested in Bulgaria, are Internationale Spedition Willi Betz
GmbH, DAEWOO, Danone, Solvay, Interbrew, Kraft Jacobs Suchard,
Nestle S.A. Westdeutsche Algemeine Zeitung, Ytong Holding, and
Rover. The latter withdrew its investment in a car-building
plant in 1996, due to “unfavorable macroeconomic environment
and government policy to foreign investors”. This is a common
problem for foreign investors. The positive news is that Rover
is expected to return to the Bulgarian market, which may be a
recognition of an improved investment climate.
Foreign investment in the banking sector was limited to the
purchase of minority shares in several Bulgarian state-owned
banks and the opening of branches of Raiffeisen Bank, ING
Bank, BNP-Dresdner Bank, National Bank of Greece, Xios Bank
and Ionian Bank. Given the low credibility of the Bulgarian
banking system, foreign banks in the country enjoy a rapidly
increasing, although still low, market share. EBRD is expected
to implement a project for investment in the United Bulgarian
Bank.
The most widely used method applied for the transfer of
ownership is direct negotiation with potential buyers. The
Privatization Agency often considers the business plan,
investment commitments and protection of employees as
important factors in addition to the price and the liabilities
undertaken. The new program of the Privatization Agency
envisages a wider use of other means of sale, such as auctions
and public sale of stocks. The latter is dependent on the
start of the operation of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, which
is expected in mid-1997.
Payment can be performed through different means: cash;
external debt bonds (Brady bonds); or bonds issued under the
Law on Settlement of Non-Performing Credits. The bonds are
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very attractive to investors, as they can be purchased at
prices far below the recognized payment value. The usage of
Brady bonds, however, is limited to up to 50% of the
transaction cost.
Table 9: Foreign investment in Bulgaria by country
Country Sum (in USD) Number of
deals
% of total
volume
Germany 232 665 232 322 28.00%
Holland 85 649 640 87 10.31%
Great Britain 64 382 525 140 7.75%
USA 55 402 896 201 6.67%
Switzerland 52 922 049 95 6.35%
Greece 49 535 226 1104 5.96%
Austria 42 021 724 202 5.06%
Luxembourg 32 101 370 20 3.86%
Belgium 31 249 347 98 3.76%
Cyprus 31 212 507 146 3.76%
Russia 30 688 407 510 3.69%
Korea 22 759 199 12 2.74%
France 18 668 126 98 2.25%
Ireland 17 595 394 15 2.12%
Others 64 065 865 5149 7.71%
Total: 830 919 507 8199 100.00%
Source: Privatization Agency
Table 10. Foreign investment in Bulgaria by branch
Branch Sum (in USD) % of total volume
Industry 201 418 000 24.24%
Food-stuff industry 122 140 000 14.70%
Financial sector 113 127 000 13.61%
Tourism 77 784 000 9.36%
Transport 73 130 000 8.80%
Communications 18 932 000 2.28%
Others 224 388 000 27.10%
Total: 830 919 507 100.00%
Source: Privatization Agency
Foreign investment by year
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70
Foreign Investment in Central and Eastern
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bulgaria
Albania
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
71
9. SOCIAL COSTS OF TRANSITION
In 1996, six years after the initial attempt to implement
market-based stabilization in Bulgaria, the economy fell into
a deep crisis, which heavily affected the standard of living
of Bulgarians. In 1996 the share of households with income
below the subsistence-minimum rose to 54% of the total number
of households, or by 30 percentage points compared to 1990.
Respectively, the share of households with income below the
social-minimum increased from 41% in 1990 to 73% in 1996. The
inequality of income distribution deepened in the last years —
the ratio between incomes of wealthiest and poorest groups in
Bulgaria rose from 3.5 in 1990 to 5.8 in 1996.
Bulgarian households’ income has declined by 65.6% since 1990.
The share of wages and pensions in total household income
remained predominant and was approximately 70% in 1996.
Property income and income from entrepreneurship, which are
the only sources of income without real erosion, continue to
be only a small part of total income (6% in 1996) and cannot
change the overall negative tendency.
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Wages and pensions were seriously eroded by inflation in the
last years. The average monthly wage in real terms in 1996 was
just 42% of its 1990 level. The sharp depreciation of the lev
in 1996 and the first months of 1997 drastically reduced wages
in dollar terms. From about $110 in 1995 the monthly dollar
wage fell to $20 in the first months of 1997. (Its level was
almost the same in February 1991 when initial price
liberalization took place.). With respect to the monthly
dollar wage in 1996, Bulgaria ranks last among the transition
economies and is the only one to have had such a sharp
reduction. The average monthly pension has declined by 65%
over the 1990-1996 period. In the beginning of 1997 its
equivalent in dollars was just $10.
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The decline in income was directly reflected in the
deteriorating structure of household expenditures. Food
purchases as a share of total expenditures grew from 36.3% in
1990 to 47% in 1996. The relative shares of expenditures on
clothing and footwear, education and leisure declined during
the above mentioned period. The structural changes in
household expenditures adversely affected the amount and
quality of final consumption.
The sharp reduction in 1996 in real GDP (around 10%) had a
negative impact on employment. The unemployment rate started
to rise in mid-1996, and reached 12.5% in December, among the
highest in the transition countries. Taking into account the
needed structural changes to restore long-term economic
growth, it will be not surprising if the unemployment rate in
1997 continues to increase.
The severe drop in the standard of living in recent years is
reflected in the demographic indicators — the death rate
increased and at the same time the birth rate fell. As a
result the natural increase of the population worsened from -
0.4 per 1,000 in 1990 to -5.0 per 1,000 in 1995.
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The decline in living standards led to the erosion of the
credibility of the Government and vast political instability
in the beginning of 1997. The ability of politicians, led by
President Stoyanov,
 
to avoid widespread unrest and to revive
people’s confidence in government institutions is encouraging
evidence for the depth of the democratic process in Bulgaria.
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10. METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SCENARIOS
Transition economies are essentially economies of
disequilibrium and uncertainty. In assessing long-term
prospects for such economies, one should put more weight on
political risk factors. In other words, from the sets of
typical country risk factors,42 those related to the role of
government and external (geopolitical) environment are
expected to play a decisive role and, therefore, must attract
more attention. For the same reason, it is important to define
what a successful reform policy is.
In general terms, such policies require an economic growth
orientation of the government and relative absence of welfare
sentiments.43  The objectives of the reform do not differ from
those in other emerging markets, e.g., in Latin America, and
include: macroeconomic stability, external viability, reducing
the role of the public sector, and achieving private sector-
led growth. More concretely, a long-run successful economic
transition policy should, at a minimum, include establishment
of the following:44
1. a stable and convertible currency, and stable financial
institutions;
2. rule of law, irrevocable private property rights and an
entrepreneurship-friendly environment;
3. easy access to capital, and, broadly speaking, to factors of
production, for foreign and domestic investors; broad-range,
prompt and transparent privatization; a sound capital market
and financial institutions;
4. a set of contract-enforcing institutions; uncorrupted
police, magistrates, courts and central and local government
administration;
5. a set of competitive and transparent conditions for private
provision of formerly public services in the fields of
social safety nets, education, health care and
infrastructure.
Of the five above-mentioned criteria Bulgaria has only just
recently (in fact since July 1997) met the requirement for a
convertible and stable currency thanks to the introduction of
the currency board regime. As is shown in Table 1, the
dynamics of key economic indicators for the last five years
suggest a downward trend. The achievement of the rest of the
                    
42 More specifically, we assume that these factors fall into five groups: a) debt indicators: debt/GDP
ratio, debt service ratios, debt structure, secondary (country’s) sovereign debt market, etc.; b) internal
indicators: current account as percent of GDP, import/export fluctuations; structure of exports, terms of
trade, etc.; c) internal indicators: structure of investment, GDP per capita, inflation, etc.; d) domestic
political risk indicators: reforms’ continuity and government commitment to reforms, stability of the
economic environment, entry and exit barriers, transaction costs, property rights and contract
enforcement, etc.; e) international risk indicators: probabilities of war, external shocks, blocked trade
routes, market protectionism, etc.
43See: Richard Beilock, What Exists is Possible, pp. 7-8.
44See: Richard Beilock, op. cit., p. 7; Anders Aslund, The Role of the State in the Transition to
Capitalism, John H. Moore (ed.), Legacies of the Collapse of Marxism. 190-191.
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points on the list is still in the future, and the stability
of the currency has to be supported by a range of policies,
promised but not yet implemented. This adds an even heavier
“political” accent on any speculation about the prospects of
the Bulgarian economy. In other words, when we consider
different 2scenarios we must pay attention to a) policies that
facilitate or hamper provisional developments; b) domestic
initial conditions and demographics; and c) possible regional
developments.45
                    
45Jeffrey Sachs, “The limits of convergence: nature, nurture and growth,” The Economist, June 14,
1997
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